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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
Since its founding in 1979, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known popularly by the 
acronym PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), has become the dominant group fighting for the 
interests of Turkey’s Kurdish population.  This paper examines the PKK’s strategy in the last 
three decades.  Throughout its existence, the PKK has had variation in its ideology, political 
engagement, and use of violence.  This thesis seeks to explain such variation within the 
framework of the party’s intentional strategic and tactical choices.    
 I have found strong evidence that the PKK is a rational organization that evolves its 
strategy and tactics to adapt in different contexts and to temporal and geographic movement.  
The party has primarily adapted and acted with an interest in maintaining its legitimacy and 
cultivating public support. The group and its leaders have used legal and illegal means in parallel 
to become advocates for Turkey’s Kurds and have effected significant change. 
 
The Rationality of Terrorism 
 Focus on the use of violence by extra-governmental groups is frequently concentrated on 
outrage.  In the current world order, national governments have a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence; even the use of force by most national governments is closely monitored and often 
sharply criticized by the international community.   This leads most people, including scholars, 
to leave aside the question of whether violence is a useful strategic and tactical tool for non-state 
actors.  This becomes increasingly true when that violence is directed at uninvolved parties or 
civilians, as is often the case with terrorism.  However, Clausewitz recognized the political utility 
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of war over a century ago, and he was hardly the first; just as violence can be an effective tool 
for governments, it has proven its value to other actors as well.1 
Most definitions of terrorism acknowledge that terrorists frequently act to further political 
or social objectives.2  Among those who study terrorism, however, there has been disagreement 
in recent years regarding the motivation and rationality of terrorist groups.  Particularly in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, there have been an increasing number of scholars who 
argue that the actions of terrorist organizations are not truly a reflection of political ideals, but 
instead are acts of aimless, wanton violence.3  Terrorism’s lack of conventional military 
objectives such as immediate territorial control or victory in a war of attrition only further these 
views.4  Despite sometimes acknowledging their political motives, many scholars and 
international actors deny the rationality of terrorists.5  
Among others in the field, however, there has been an increasing effort to understand acts 
of terrorism as the result of rational, politically motivated calculations.6  Scholars who study 
terrorism, including Max Abrahms and Martha Crenshaw, often make the argument for 
rationality by demonstrating whether organizations meet the assumptions that make up the 
“strategic model”.7  The strategic model requires that terrorists meet three requirements in order 
to qualify as rational: motivation by relatively consistent preferences; decisions made through an 
evaluation of the political risks and rewards; and adoption of terrorism when it is the option 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 General Carl Von Clausewitz, On War: A Modern Military Classic (Virginia: Wilder Publications, 
2008), 34. 
2 Oliver P. Richmond, “Realizing Hegemony? Symbolic Terrorism and the Roots of Conflict,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2008): 290. 
3 Richmond, “Realizing Hegemony?” 290. 
4 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence 5 no. 4 (Winter 
1993): 23. 
5 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 
International Security 32 No. 4 (Spring 2008): 79. 
6 see: Merari, Richmond, Crenshaw, Pape 
7 Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want,” 79. 
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promising the largest return.8  The assumption that terrorist organizations are rational allows 
analysis of their actions as political behavior, rather than merely aimless destruction or random 
criminal activity.9  For actors that meet the criteria of the strategic model, scholars can focus on 
the objective, pragmatic conditions that define their strategy, rather than purely ideological or 
emotional concerns.10  Though these scholars acknowledge that there are acts of terrorism that 
are simply what Ariel Merari classifies as “expressive”, motivated by sheer frustration or a desire 
for revenge rather than political calculation, they are the exception rather than the rule.11  For 
groups that conform to the assumptions of the strategic model, the scholars posit that their 
actions are driven by strategic and pragmatic concerns.  
PKK fulfills the criteria of the strategic model.  It demonstrates its motivation by 
relatively consistent principles through its dedication to Kurdish ethno-nationalist ideals, even as 
the precise form of its demands has adapted in the face of changing political realities.12  Though 
some critiques question this consistency due to its varying devotion to Marxism, and their 
relatively recent emphasis on liberal values, these motivations are secondary to its ethno-
nationalist priorities.13  The PKK’s evaluation of political risks and rewards is evident in the 
shortage of other available options for advocating for Kurdish rights in Turkey.14  Throughout 
the period of PKK activity, Turkish law has consistently made it a crime to even discuss the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want,” 79. 
9 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13 No. 4 (July 1981): 380. 
10 Richmond, “Realizing Hegemony?” 292. 
11 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” 23. 
12 Henri Barkey and Grahm Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc,. 1998), 23. 
13 Michael Radu, “The Land of Many Crossroads: The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis (2001): 48. 
Chapter Two will discuss this in more detail. 
14 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New 
York University Press, 2007), 192. 
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surrounding issues, all but eliminating the feasibility in other courses of action.15  The repeated 
exclusion of Kurdish politicians from the political scene further reinforced the conviction that 
only violence offered sufficient returns.  Thus, a close examination of the strategic model 
demonstrates that the PKK is a rational organization.  
Though this specific debate is relatively recent, the underlying concepts are hardly novel. 
In the 1980s, Schelling argued at length about the diplomatic nature of violence, explicitly laying 
out the ways in which violence can be used for the purpose of inflicting pain to motivate changes 
in behavior; he refers to this as the “power to hurt” as opposed to the use of violence for “brute 
force.”16  He then defines the power to hurt as bargaining power.  Given his early description of 
diplomacy as bargaining, consequently, the “power to hurt” or coercive violence becomes 
defined as diplomacy.17  Thus, while viewing terrorism as diplomacy provokes an instinctive 
condemnation, and it’s hardly an orthodox definition, the theoretical underpinnings of the 
concept, and the argument for the potential rewards of violence, are well established in existing 
literature. 
There are valid arguments against the rationality of terrorist groups.  Perhaps the 
strongest empirical argument is the allegation that terror simply does not work; therefore, 
rational risk and reward analysis would never result in violence.  Erica Chenoweth and Maria 
Stephan support this argument with an empirical study, concluding that nonviolent means are 
more effective than violence, and that nonviolence achieves the stated goals of a group more 
often.18  Their study of groups pursuing violent or nonviolent political action between 1900 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State 
Ethnic Conflict, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 200. 
16 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 240. 
17 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 240. 
18 Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent 
Conflict,” International Security 33 No. 1 (Summer 2008): 7. 
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2006 indicated that nonviolent movements have succeeded 53 percent of the time, as opposed to 
the 26 percent success rate of violence.19  They attribute the higher efficacy of nonviolent 
methods to two primary factors: the ways in which nonviolent movements generate legitimacy 
and participation; and the difficulty governments have in justifying their utilization of violence 
against nonviolent civilians.  Many have used Chenoweth and Stephan’s argument to support the 
claims of terrorist irrationality; however, regardless of the veracity of Chenoweth and Stephan’s 
broader claims, their arguments do not account for the circumstances surrounding the PKK. 
First, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that the international community is more likely to 
view nonviolent movements as legitimate and, consequently, to provide them with outside aid.  
In the case of the PKK, however, support coming from outside countries including Syria, Iraq, 
Iran and, arguably Greece, was precisely because of their violent tactics.20  Syria used the PKK 
in its negotiations with Turkey, sheltering and supporting the PKK for almost two decades as a 
way to put pressure on the Turkish state.21  The PKK was well aware of the tensions in the 
region; it was common practice for countries in the region to use neighbors’ Kurdish populations 
against them, particularly during contentious bilateral negotiations.22  The increased likelihood of 
support because of the PKK’s use of violence eliminates this advantage of nonviolent conflict 
and further supports the rationality of the PKK’s violent tactics.   
Second, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that states risk losing legitimacy when they attack 
peaceful movements, as opposed to when they pursue and persecute terrorism, which increases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Stephan and Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 8. 
20 Kevin Alger, “Lessons from Contemporary Insurgency: The PKK’s Enduring Fight.” (Fort Huachuca, 
AZ: University of Military Intelligence, 2008), 8. 
21 Henri Barkey and Grahm Fuller, “Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed 
Opportunities,” Middle East Journal 51 No. 1 (Winter 1997): 75. 
22 Marcus, Blood and Belief, 98. 
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the efficacy of nonviolent movements.23  In Turkey, however, it had become clear by the end of 
the 1970s that, regardless of the consequences, the Turkish military and the Turkish government 
were more than willing to use violence.  A history of brutally repressing Turkey’s Kurdish 
citizens, the mass imprisonments following the 1971 and 1980 coups and the frequent use of 
torture had not cost either one enough to affect their actions.  The state only continued to support 
this belief in its use of excessive violence against both violent and nonviolent actors throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s.24  Thus, Chenoweth and Stephan’s theory does not account for the PKK’s 
analysis of risks and rewards.  Indeed, after contextual analysis, this powerful argument in favor 
of the irrationality of terrorists only strengthens the assertion that the PKK is a rational actor.   
Even if one agrees that such groups are rational political actors, the decision to treat them 
as such remains contentious.  There is an understandable concern that speaking with such groups 
could teach them that violence is rewarded; unfortunately, this lesson has already been well 
learned.  Groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), and the African National Congress (ANC), have already established the ability of 
violence to lead to recognition and legitimacy on the international stage.25  There are also 
multiple ways in which groups and their supporters define success: for example, Merari defines 
the four potential definitions of success for terrorist organizations as recruitment, international 
attention, international legitimacy, and partial concessions.26  By these standards, groups like Al-
Qaeda or Boko Haram, who remain outcasts in the international community, have still achieved 
certain degrees of success.27  These varied definitions of success affect the risk-benefit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Stephan and Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 9. 
24 Marcus, Blood and Belief, 176. 
25 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” 28; Richmond, “Realizing Hegemony?” 308. 
26 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” 26. 
27 Erica Chenoweth, Nicholas Miller, and Elizabeth McClellan, “Correspondence: What Makes Terrorists 
Tick,” International Security 33 No. 4 (Spring 2009): 182. 
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calculations performed by rational actors, particularly if the situation is one in which other 
avenues seem to yield minimal, if any, rewards.28  
Such issues lead to the larger concern that negotiating with terrorists or including them in 
existing political structures requires concessions regarding political and moral norms.  Many 
governments argue that treating such groups as legitimate political actors would establish 
political violence as a tool of diplomacy, rather than an unacceptable act of aggression.29 As such 
violence is the tool of marginalized actors, often employed against those who establish global 
norms, these concessions become even more complex.  However, it is also true that between 
1968 and 2009, 43 percent of terrorist groups ultimately entered the political process, usually by 
way of negotiations with those who held power in the existing structure.30  This figure does not 
include organizations that declared unilateral ceasefires, bringing conflict to a close, or at least a 
long-term halt.31  Whether or not the idea is palatable, the evidence suggests that recognition and 
incorporation of groups that utilize political violence is an important avenue of exploration in 
counterterrorism efforts.   
  
Views of the PKK 
Overall, the literature regarding the rationality of terrorist organizations is extensive, 
accounting for multiple situations and perspectives.  The debate has large policy implications, 
particularly for negotiations like those ongoing between the Turkish government and the PKK.  
Unfortunately, very little of the literature on rationality deals specifically with the PKK, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Marcus, Blood and Belief, 29. 
29 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 383. 
30 Chenoweth, Miller and McClellan, “What Makes Terrorists Tick,” 182. 
31 Chenoweth, Miller and McClellan, “What Makes Terrorists Tick,” 182. 
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what there is often affected by adamant efforts to censor news of the conflict.32  Consequently, 
discussions of rationality pertaining to the PKK are highly polarized, even within American and 
European academic communities.   
Most popular literature, and even a large portion of academic literature, treats the PKK as 
cold-blood killers, describing it as a group with no focused ideology.  Instead, such writers 
portray it as a group of common criminals, motivated only by opportunism and a lust for 
power.33  The primary engine of this lust for power is Abdullah Ocalan, who has led the PKK 
since its inception.  Many scholars further describe him as a Stalinist and a megalomaniac, who 
has shaped the PKK into a personality cult.34  Some go so far as to deny the PKK’s nationalist 
aspirations or its popular Kurdish support entirely.35  Scholars with these views often attribute 
the PKK’s widespread popularity among Kurds to intimidation, extortion, and harassment.36   As 
evidence, they point to inconsistent aspects of its ideology and a high number of civilian 
casualties to demonstrate the organization’s inherent tendency towards violence, rather than its 
identity as an actor for whom violence is the means to achieve political aspirations.37   
Historically, the Turkish government has insisted that conflict with the PKK and the 
government’s difficult relations with the Kurds are not about nationalism at all; rather, such 
issues are entirely due to the economic inequities that exist in the predominantly Kurdish 
southeast.38  In response, the government has invested billions in the southeastern portion of 
Turkey; the most famous example of this is the $20 billion Southeastern Anatolian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Marcus, Blood and Belief, 3. 
33 Radu, “The Land of Many Crossroads,” 48. 
34 Lesser, et al., “Countering the New Terrorism,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 106. 
35 Radu, “The Land of Many Crossroads,” 51. 
36 Lesser, et al., “Countering the New Terrorism,” 105. 
37 Radu, “The Land of Many Crossroads,” 52. 
38 David L. Phillips, “Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker’s Party,” Foreign 
Policy Interests (2007): 13. 
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Project/Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP).39  It is undeniably the case that economic inequality 
disproportionately impacts Turkey’s Kurdish citizens.40  However, academic studies on the 
broader impact of economic factors on terrorism have been inconclusive.41  Specifically in 
Turkey, as the economic situation overall and the southeast in particular have improved, the 
extent of PKK efforts have not abated.  In recent years, when Turkey had its best economic 
performance in decades, the PKK also increased its violence to its highest levels since the 
1990s.42  In addition, the conflict with the PKK is part of the reason why many predominantly 
Kurdish districts have suffered economically, precluding a simple cause and effect narrative.43 
Thus, temporal comparison and close examination demonstrate that economic inequality alone is 
an inadequate explanation for the PKK’s actions. 
Only recently have some scholars, most of whom have spent extensive amounts of time 
in the region, begun to examine the issue in a different light.  Such analyses take into account 
popular support for the PKK, and certainly for the ideas it espouses, has been and remains strong 
among many in Turkey.44  Some suggest that this is due to its apparent impact: since the start of 
the PKK’s military actions, there has been an increasing awareness of and space for the Kurdish 
identity in Turkey’s public sphere.  Many attribute this change to Ocalan and the PKK, pointing 
out that these developments have been highly correlated with the PKK’s militant actions.45  
While coincidence or alternative causation is certainly possible, the pattern deserves closer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” (Washington DC: Foreign Agriculture Service, United States 
Department of Agriculture). 
40 Metin Ozaslan, Bulent Dincer, and Huseyin Ozgur, “Regional Disparities and Territorial Indicators in 
Turkey: Socio-Economic Development Index (SEDI),” (Pamukkale, Turkey: State Planning Organisation, 
Pumakkale University, 2000): 14. 
41 See Lyall, Gause, and Li regarding democracy and Piazza, Ehrlich and Krueger regarding economic 
determinants of terrorism 
42 “Turkey: Ending the PKK Insurgency,” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 2011), 5. 
43 Kirisci, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, 185. 
44 Phillips, “Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker’s Party,” 18. 
45 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 181. 
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examination.  This thesis will discuss both the PKK’s efficacy and its popular support in greater 
depth.  
 
Strategy and Tactics 
 If one accepts that the PKK is a rational actor, it necessarily entails that, like any other 
actors, the party strategizes and plans tactics in order to achieve its ends; furthermore, it is 
possible to consistently trace related decisions.  In order to better understand these, it is 
important to specifically define of strategy and tactics within the context of this paper. 
 The U.S. Department of Defense defines a strategic plan as one that dictates “the overall 
conduct” of a conflict.46  Strategy determines long-term objectives and provides guidance as to 
the appropriate use of resources in pursuit of these objectives.47  Such objectives are not 
immediate, but rather at the theater, national, or multinational level.48  Strategy, in other words, 
is the long plan. 
 Tactics, in contrast, are the immediate actions implemented in order to achieve long-term 
goals.49  Tactics are applied in the short-term; military definitions refer to individual 
engagements and the authority over fire, “limited to detailed direction of movements or 
maneuvers.”50  In other words, tactics establish immediate goals and priorities, as well as the way 
in which they should be achieved.   Such goals and priorities contribute to the achievement of 
strategic objectives; however, they are only a partial step.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms I-02,” 
(Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 251. 
47 Joint Chiefs, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms I-02,” 251. 
48 Joint Chiefs, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms I-02,” 251. 
49 Joint Chiefs, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms I-02,” 258. 
50 Joint Chiefs, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms I-02,” 257. 
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 In order to better understand the PKK, one must understand both the strategic and tactical 
levels of planning.  Tactics reveal the reasons why someone uses a specific weapon at a 
particular time and place, while strategy can inform the audience regarding the ultimate goal of a 





In order to better understand violence and its utility, I intend to momentarily set aside 
questions of morality. That is not to say such questions are not important; however, I am hardly 
qualified to draw conclusions in this area. Instead, I intend to take advantage of the relative 
impartiality and objectivity I gain with distance.  To this end, several pieces of terminology 
become important, specifically the term “terrorism” and certain geographic descriptors.   
The word ‘terrorist’ is often used for its generic meaning, one that carries value 
judgments and strong associations especially after 9/11.  Such subjective connotations and broad 
meaning are not constructive in achieving a better understanding of the objective determinants of 
a given act. Some scholars in their work on the PKK avoid using the term at all, as it carries so 
many connotations.51  With that in mind, I will seek to refer to groups by their names as much as 
possible, and by more general terms such as ‘party’, ‘group’, or ‘organization’ where a specific 
name may not be appropriate.  ‘Terrorism’ carries similar connotations, making it difficult to 
better examine violent political action.  Where possible, I will seek to refer to events as ‘political 
violence’ or merely ‘acts of violence’ rather than ‘terrorist attacks’. 
On occasions where using the term ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ is appropriate and 
unavoidable, I use it in accordance with its specific definition in international law.  For the 	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Convention on Financing Terrorism, 194 of 197 signatory states agree that “attacks by freedom 
fighters and other combatants in armed conflict…[targeting] civilians…amount to terrorist 
acts.”52  Similar definitions acknowledge that the motivation of terrorist groups is often 
“grounded in an underlying political or ideological purpose, which thus differentiates terrorism 
from criminal acts similarly designed to spread fear.”53   Many of the PKK’s actions fall within 
the parameters of this admittedly broad definition, and it is in keeping with this definition, rather 
than with a particular value judgment, that I will employ the term.54   
There is also a great deal of overlap between terrorist actions and guerilla warfare; the 
two terms are often conflated.55  Conceptually, they are distinct descriptors, particularly as they 
relate to desired ends and utilized means: while guerilla warfare often involves a war of attrition, 
conducted with tactics similar to those of conventional armies, terrorism is almost entirely about 
coercion.56  Perhaps the easiest ways to distinguish the two relate to the number of participants 
and the importance of territory.  Guerilla warfare requires large groups of people and involves 
considerably more violence over a wider geographic area.  Terrorism, in contrast, involves very 
small groups conducting very targeted acts.57  Furthermore, to those involved in guerilla warfare, 
command of territory is extremely important; it ensures access to resources and the 
implementation of effective logistics.58  Terrorism, in contrast, has no interest in claiming 
territory as a direct consequence of the violent act; rather, it aims to convince governments or 
other actors that such a concession would be in their best interest.  Further parsing of the two 
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terms is an important academic exercise; in reality the two are often simultaneous.  While it can 
be extremely difficult to distinguish between the two, due to their operational similarity and 
frequent proximity, I will try to apply each term in the most specific manner possible, and will 
endeavor to avoid conflation.  
Finally, I will be referring to the region of “Kurdistan.”59  This is not intended as a 
political statement; rather, I am following the example of previous scholars in the field who have 
concurred that it is the most accurate way to refer to a particular geographic region not defined 
by internationally recognized boundaries.60   “Kurdistan” refers to parts of Iran, Syria, Turkey 
and Iraq that are primarily inhabited by Kurds.  “Turkish Kurdistan” or Northwestern Kurdistan 
refers to those provinces in the southeast of Turkey in which Kurds have historically made up the 
majority of residents.  This region is also where the majority of the PKK’s activity has taken 
place.61  Though the Turkish government is notorious for refusing to record ethnic statistics 
among their population, it is well established that the majority of residents in these particular 
provinces continue to claim Kurdish identity.62   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Figure 1: Map of Turkey and Kurdistan. 
60 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 190. 
61 See Figure 1: Map of Turkey and Kurdistan 
62 Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds, 12. 
 	   18 
 
Figure 1: Map of Turkey and Kurdistan.  The purple lines outline the official Southeastern Anatolian 





According to the most common estimates, there are currently approximately 15 million 
Kurds living in Turkey; due to the lack of ethnic self-identification on the Turkish national 
census, it is impossible to know exact numbers.63  Turkey contains approximately half of the 
Kurdish population in the region; the remaining half is split between Syria, Northern Iraq and 
Iran.  Within Turkey, Kurds are approximately twenty percent of the population, yet their 
existence has been denied throughout much of Turkish history.64  Today, the predominantly 
Kurdish provinces of Turkey are the poorest in the country and have been under military rule for 
the majority of their existence.65  Any numbers pertaining to the conflict are difficult to obtain 
because the government has been loathe to disclose what goes on in its southeastern provinces; 
casualty numbers are difficult to come by and often vary greatly depending on who is reporting 
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them.  According to all estimates, however, it is undeniable that the Kurdish population in 
Turkey has been oppressed and persecuted since the Republic was founded, if not before. 
The Kurds have been fighting for independence since the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923.  Historically, the Turkish military has met Kurdish uprisings with bloody 
retribution.  Repression has not only been military; political and cultural expression was also 
suppressed, often harshly.  Even the acknowledgement of Kurdish identity was anathema in 
public arenas: until the 1990s, Kurds were referred to as “mountain Turks” in official parlance, 
when they were discussed at all.66   
 
Pre-Republican History 
Turkey’s refusal to recognize Kurds as a minority has its precedents in Ottoman law.  
During the Ottoman Empire, the legal code, based originally in Islamic shari’a, only recognized 
religious minorities.67  Particularly during later portions of Ottoman rule, Islam was seen as a 
binding commonality that transcended ethnicity.68  This was one of the bedrocks of Ottoman 
rule, as the sultan was not only a secular leader, but the caliph as well, with the right to rule over 
all true believers in the faith.69   Throughout much of the Empire’s history, this was a fairly 
effective system that Kurdish subjects accepted fairly readily; unlike many Ottoman subjects 
who began gaining a strong sense of national identity at odds with imperial rule in the Balkans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Phillips, “Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker’s Party,” 10. 
67 Ergil, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey,” 123. 
68 Kirisci, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, 90. 
69 Major Andrew Morgado, “Turkish Culture and its Influence on the Counter-Insurgency Campaign 
Against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 
2005): 9. 
 	   20 
and parts of the Middle East, Kurdish nationalism was a relatively late arrival, only crystallizing 
around the turn of the twentieth century.70 
These nationalist aspirations were recognized in the Treaty of Sevres, the 1920 agreement 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers of World War I.  With the end of the war 
and the defeat of the Germans and their Turkish allies, European powers divided what remained 
of the Ottoman Empire.   Originally, much of the division was drawn along ethnic lines, and the 
treaty included a provision for Kurdish autonomy, with the dangling possibility of future 
independence.71  The divisions of Sevres, however, would prove to be fleeting.  A young 
Ottoman military commander, Mustafa Kemal, now known primarily by his adopted surname, 
Ataturk, led resistance to the foreign occupation.  The next treaty with major European powers 
and a state on the Anatolian Peninsula was the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, signed by a similar set 
of European powers and the fledgling Turkish Republic.  Unlike Sevres, Lausanne mostly treated 
Turkey as a united state.72  It made no provisions for ethnic minorities and no mention of the 
Kurds. 
 
The Early Republic and the Early Resistance 
From the start of the Republic, Ataturk’s government emphasized the importance and 
supremacy of the new Turkish ethnicity.  The newly written Turkish Constitution recognized 
only Turkish citizens and Turkish speakers within the Republic.  Authority was highly 
centralized, resting with the central government in Ankara, rather than local governments or 
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minority groups.   Dissatisfied with this arrangement, the Kurds soon rose up against the new 
state.  The government responded quickly and brutally. 
Perhaps the most famous of the early Kurdish revolts was the Sheikh Said rebellion.  
After capturing and executing Said in 1925, the military killed another estimated fifteen to 
twenty-five thousand Kurds in an effort to discourage further rebellion.73  The government then 
placed the region under authoritarian military rule.  A new set of punitive laws were put in place 
in 1934 in reaction the region’s continued defiance.  This period of defiance culminated in 1937-
1938 with the Dersim74 massacres.75  Official Turkish literature about the massacres is scant; 
however, the story very much lives on in Kurdish oral history.76 
In the wake of Dersim, no significant resistance arose, either by violent or political 
means, until the 1960s.  The group advocating for Kurdish rights in the 1960s was very different 
from those who had conducted militant rebellions against the state in the 1920s and 1930s; now 
it was the educated elite who took up the banner of Kurdish rights.  By this time, many Kurds 
had migrated to the western regions of Turkey at this time, seeking education, better wages and a 
higher standard of living in the metropolitan centers of western Turkey.  The Turkish 
government encouraged this migration, hoping that it would foster assimilation and integration; 
consequently, it provided a number of academic scholarships at universities in Istanbul and 
Ankara to promising Kurdish students.  In the 1960s, large numbers of these migrants started 
forming cultural and political groups, affiliated with the political left, and dedicated to promoting 
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Kurdish rights.  They demanded language rights, representation in parliament, economic 
development in the southeast, and limited regional autonomy for the same area.77   
Unfortunately, the state reacted no better to this form of protest.78  After a military coup 
in March 1971, leaders of Kurdish groups were among those arrested, imprisoned, or killed.  The 
1970s in Turkey were a decade of extreme political groups, with many resorting to violence to 
make their point; perhaps the most famous of these is the Grey Wolves, a radical nationalist 
group.79  The large number of leftist, Marxist parties operating in Turkey in the early 1970s, such 
as Dev Genc and Dev Yol, attracted many, particularly students.  Among those who flocked to 
join were large numbers of disaffected Kurdish youth, frustrated with a system in which the odds 
seemed stacked against them.80  
 
The Early PKK 
One of the students attracted to these leftist groups, Abdullah Ocalan, studied political 
science at Ankara University.  Ocalan was among many Kurdish Leftists who were frustrated 
with the disinterest of their peers in addressing Kurdish issues.81  He and several others formed 
what became the PKK in the late 1970s; the official date is cited as often November 25, 1979.  
Like many other organizations of the time, this new party espoused Marxist-Leninist views; 
however, it accompanied this ideology with fervent Kurdish nationalism.82  Though some ethnic 
Turks were initially involved with the founding of the PKK, the organization soon became 
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exclusively Kurdish.83  Due to their previous experiences with Leftist groups, the PKK’s 
founding members brought preexisting tactics, organization and ideology to their new party.84  
Ocalan already had a wide network from the seven months he spent in prison following the 1971 
coup for his involvement with Dev Genc.85  Other future members of the PKK had fled Turkey 
after the 1971 coup, only returning after several years in Germany.  While in Europe, many met 
members of politically violent groups from Black September to Baader-Meinhof, forming 
connections and learning from these experienced organizations.86  The PKK was by no means 
the only organization devoted to Kurdish nationalism founded at this time; however, it would 
prove to possess unusual longevity.   
The PKK began its violent activities with a focus on the Marxist components of their 
ideology.  While decisive evidence is lacking, the party is thought to be responsible for the 
assassinations of a number of wealthy Kurdish landowners in 1978 and 1979, as well as a few 
small military operations.87  During the 1970s, PKK tactics did not stand out; rather, its use and 
level of violence were consistent with other contemporary groups.88  Similarly, the authoritarian 
style of leadership that quickly became apparent was consistent with other groups of the time.  
From the beginning, Ocalan did not appreciate opposition, dominating decision-making within 
the group.89  Separating the history of the PKK from the history of Ocalan is almost impossible; 
his personality, energy and charisma have arguably made the party what it is, and, due to the 
hierarchical leadership structure, he has dictated much of the organization’s goals and strategic 
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choices over the years.90  The merits and morality of Ocalan’s involvement can be debated: its 
extent, however, is undeniable.   
The rigid hierarchy of the party is one area in which the PKK has made decisions that are 
not necessarily rational.  Rather than determining the leadership structure through a series of 
calculated choices or designing it for maximum efficiency and efficacy, most scholars agree that 
it was likely the result of strong personalities, particularly that of Ocalan, and of norms at the 
time for similar groups.91  The devolution of the leadership structure into a strictly authoritarian 
command hierarchy is a frequent example of the PKK’s lack of rationality.  This is not incorrect; 
the leadership structure does not seem to be the result of deliberate decision-making.  However, 
one example of irrational behavior does not prove that everything the group does is similarly 
irrational. 
In September 1980, the military overthrew the government again.  This military 
government imitated its predecessors, arresting and imprisoning large numbers of politically 
active citizens.  Again, many such citizens fled Turkey, migrating to Europe or surrounding 
countries.  Ocalan had already left, fleeing to Syria with several other PKK members in July of 
1979. Some argue that the PKK destroyed competing groups advocating similar political agenda 
before 1980; others simply argue that the majority of these groups were destroyed in the 
widespread crackdown following the 1980 coup.92  In either case, the PKK thrived in Syria, 
collaborating with Palestinian nationalist groups to train fighters, and attracting the patronage of 
the Syrian government.93  In July 1981, the PKK held its first Conference in the Beka’a valley of 
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Lebanon where its training camps were based.  By this time, the organization had clearly 
established its intention to pursue political violence.94  
It was not until 1984 that the PKK officially began their military struggle against the 
Turkish government and military.  In the intervening years, Ocalan made allies and consolidated 
control.  Former members of the PKK have stated that he either ordered or encouraged the deaths 
of other potential leaders or dissenting voices within the PKK, leading to the deaths of at least 11 
people between 1983 and 1985.95  Ocalan also began reaching out to Kurdish nationalists in 
northern Iraq, as well as Marxist groups within Turkey.  The PKK’s blend of ideologies helped it 
to make connections with groups with a variety of different ideologies, and gain their sympathy 
and support.96  Thanks to a network of shared ideologies and interests, the PKK remained the 
guests of the Syrian government for many years, basing its training camps in Lebanon’s Beka’a 
Valley for almost two decades. 
 
Military Struggle 
On August 15, 1984, the PKK began a struggle against the Turkish government and 
military that has lasted for three decades.  The first two attacks were not hugely destructive: the 
attacks, which targeted a military barracks in Eruh and a gendarmerie barracks and officers’ club 
in Semdinli, killed one and injured nine.97  However, they were only the start of a conflict that 
would kill tens of thousands over the next few decades; while official statistics are unavailable, 
the most common estimates hold that between 35,000 and 40,000 individuals have been killed 
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since the August 1984 attacks.98  At least half of those killed in the conflict have been PKK 
fighters.99  
 In addition to a loss of life, there have also been significant economic and political costs. 
The so-called “Kurdish Question” or “Kurdish Conflict” has cost the Turkish government 
between 2 and 3 percent of GDP during much of the 1990s, requiring up to one-third of the 
Turkish military’s considerable resources.100  Furthermore, the conflict has drawn in countries 
from Germany to Russia to the United States: it is a recurring topic in discussions regarding 
Turkey’s bid for European Union membership and proved detrimental to US-Turkey relations 
during the second Iraq War.101  Many argue that it has been the most significant issue in Turkish 
domestic and foreign policy over the last three decades.102  
Despite the PKK’s relevance today, it took the military some time to realize that it was 
dealing with a persistent threat rather than a handful of brigands.103  The Turkish military would 
not establish a significant presence in the region until 1985, and refused to publicly acknowledge 
the PKK as a serious adversary for several years after.104  Early PKK activity was primarily 
limited to guerilla warfare in Southeastern Turkey.105  However, it was not long before PKK 
activity expanded out of the southeast; within the first few years of PKK activity, the PKK was 
tied to several assassinations in Europe, most concerning exiled or former PKK members or 
activists.106 
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Upon realizing it was facing a serious adversary, the military took two actions in addition 
to deploying traditional troops that would deeply impact the events of the next three decades.  
The first of these was once again placing Southeastern Anatolia under military rule.107  Another 
three provinces were designated “neighboring provinces” to the region officially designated The 
Extraordinary Situation Region/Olagunustu Hal Bolge Valligi (OHAL) in 1987. OHAL did not 
officially end until 2002; since then, many of these provinces have again been placed under 
“security rule.”  Military rule entailed the suspension of the minimal protections that existed 
under Turkish law.  The state’s action against the PKK was hardly the first incident of 
extrajudicial killings, torture, and unlawful detention.  Such behavior has become a key feature 
of the conflict with the PKK, and such abuse has arguably won the PKK significant sympathy, if 
not support.108  Diyarbakir Military prison, completed in 1980 and located in the largest city in 
the OHAL province, is irreversibly tied to military abuses of power, continuing to affect the way 
in which Turkey’s Kurdish citizens view their government.109   
The second key action by the military was the reestablishment of an Ottoman-era system 
of Village Guards or Koy Korucular, civilians armed and paid by the state.  This time, the 
Turkish military explicitly intended the Koy Korucular to fight the PKK.  In a region with few 
reliable economic prospects, recruitment was rapid: by the end of 1985, there were 13,000 
Korucular.110  The Village Guard system was extremely divisive, playing off of existing tribal 
structures and clan leaders.111  Many of these tribal leaders and landowners had kept their status 
and position by cooperating with the government; therefore both the PKK’s anti-government 
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stance and its Marxist ideology presented imminent threats to established power structures in the 
region.112  The presence of opposition empowered by the government ensured that any chance, 
however small, of limiting the conflict to the PKK and the state had vanished; it was now 
irreversibly a conflict amongst the Kurdish people.113  The PKK would claim that the majority of 
their attacks on civilians throughout the 1980s and 1990s were aimed at civilian collaborators, 
particularly the Village Guards.114   
 
Waxing Power: The Early 1990s 
For the first few years of the 1990s, the PKK solidified its de facto governance of much 
of Turkey’s southeast.  Within regions under PKK control, the military was on the defensive; 
many observers describe the military’s inability to move about freely after dark.115  The PKK 
used targeted attacks on industry, military, and civilians alike to demonstrate the extent of its 
control; some argue that the PKK generated revenue by demanding that companies working in 
the area pay taxes in order to operate unmolested in the region.116  Throughout this period, the 
PKK controlled significant amounts of territory nominally under Turkish rule, establishing 
roadblocks, collecting taxes from local inhabitants and overtaking traditional authorities in the 
region.117  Such actions had a financial benefit, but also a political one: in 1992, the military was 
essentially forced to admit to private industry that it could not guarantee their safety while 
working in the region, thereby admitting its lack of control.118  In line with theories of guerilla 
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warfare strategy, the PKK secured and controlled territory for several years in the early 1990s, 
despite continued pressure from the Turkish military.119 
 To combat the increase of PKK power, the Turkish military increased its policy of 
relocation.  Regional expert Professor Henri Barkey describes the military implementing policies 
of large-scale evacuations and “razing villages” on a large scale.120  This scorched earth policy 
was intended to deprive the PKK of local support and the resources, recruits and concealment 
that it depended on.  While arguably successful, the policy had a large number of negative 
ramifications for the army; Barkey details the growing refugee population and widespread, often 
arbitrary, human rights abuses that directly resulted from the policy.121  The consequent 
alienation of local populations and the increased vitriol towards the army were only a matter of 
time.   The scale of these evacuations are still contested; while the Turkish government claims 
that only 300,000 civilians were displaced, various human rights groups argue that the number 
was at least ten times as much.122  The policy not only influenced public opinion, but had a 
dramatic influence on the demographics of Turkey’s Kurdish population. 
The early 1990s also included several important shifts in mainstream Turkish politics.  
Perhaps the two most obvious occurred in 1990 and 1991.  In June 1990, a group of Kurdish 
politicians founded Turkey’s first political party with a primary and vocal focus on Kurdish 
issues.123  The party, known as HEP, would only remain open for a few years; yet its mission has 
been carried out to the present day under parties with a variety of names.  The second 
momentous event was Prime Minister Demirel’s 1991 acknowledgement of Kurds in a public 	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speech, the first ever such mention by a major Turkish political leader.124  Under the 1983 
constitution, mention of Kurds or speaking Kurdish was punishable by law.125  In October of the 
same year, the government softened restrictions on usage of Kurdish languages, lifting the 
constitutional ban on the use of Kurdish in private life.126   
Demirel and his president, Turgut Ozal, were the first of many government leaders to 
begin to address the demands Kurds had been making for decades.  In 1993, President Ozal made 
significant progress towards negotiation and reconciliation with the PKK; allegedly Jalil 
Talibani, leader of the Iraqi PUK, acted as an interlocutor between Ozal and Ocalan.127  
Unfortunately, only days after Ocalan issued a ceasefire extension likely meant as a concrete 
positive overture, Ozal had a fatal heart attack; arguably, the inability or unwillingness of his 
successors to pursue his conciliatory policies represents a significant lost opportunity to end the 
conflict.128 
 
The Republic Strikes Back 
 In the mid-1990s, there was a shift in the conflict, as the military gradually began gaining 
ground through the use of new counterinsurgency tactics and weaponry.  Many credit the 
military’s “scorched earth” and relocation policies for weakening the PKK by depriving them of 
supplies and logistical support.129  In addition, the political situation in Turkey destabilized with 
a series of shaky coalition governments, increasing the military’s control over events; it would 
instigate a “Coup by Memorandum” in 1997, pressuring the government into resigning.  PKK 
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strategy shifted during the period as well, with an increased reliance on tactics that conform more 
closely to the definition of “terrorism”: isolated strikes at key targets, marked by disinterest in 
holding land.130  Frustrated at the inaction of European governments with regards to Turkey’s 
human rights abuses, PKK supporters in the diaspora began staging protests and attacking 
Turkish businesses throughout Western Europe.131  Within Turkey, attacks also began moving 
west; the first PKK attacks in Istanbul and Ankara took place until 1988 and the number 
increased as time went on.132   
 At their 5th Congress in January 1995, the PKK also decided to begin using suicide 
bombing as a tactic.133  Between 1996 and 1999, twenty-one suicide attacks across Turkey were 
actively claimed by or conclusively linked to the PKK.134   Most focused on attacking military 
and police personnel.135  The PKK’s use of suicide bombing, and Ocalan’s explicit endorsement 
of the tactic, is a controversial moment in their history.136  
By 1988, the PKK’s power had severely declined and its membership had decreased to an 
estimated 1,500 militants.137  Then, in October of 1998, Turkey succeeded in pressuring Syria to 
expel the PKK.  Ocalan fled first to Russia and then Italy, before being captured in Kenya on 
February 16, 1999.  The reaction was enormous: throughout Turkey and Western Europe, there 
was an outbreak of protests, self-immolations, and attacks, particularly on embassies of 
governments associated with Ocalan’s capture.  Despite this burst of activity, most theorists saw 
Ocalan’s capture as the final blow to a dying organization.  Most organizations with highly 
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centralized, Leninist command structures do not survive the arrest or death of their leader; 
consequently, analyses predicted that the PKK’s days were through and that the Turkish state 
had been victorious.138    
However, Ocalan defied expectation, becoming not a forgotten leader, but a symbol of 
Kurdish oppression and resistance.139  He continues to control the PKK from his jail cell, issuing 
statements and orders through his lawyers.  Some experts argue that his capture was even a 
turning point for the recognition of Kurdish identity, drawing international attention to military 
abuses and the long time denial of the Kurdish identity.140 
The Turkish government held Ocalan as the sole prisoner on the island of Imrali, where 
he remains today.  His trial began on May 1999 in a courtroom built especially for the 
occasion.141  The organization of the trial was extremely contentious, with questions ranging 
from the appropriate judges, the people in the courtroom, those allowed to testify, and who 
would take up the risky task of defending him.  There were allegations that the government was 
harassing his defense team; defense lawyers certainly received death threats and one was arrested 
just before the trial, though the government claimed the charges were unrelated.142   
The start of the trial brought only more controversy.  In his opening statements, Ocalan 
appeared to refute everything the PKK had fought for, declaring his respect for the Turkish state, 
apologizing for the bloodshed, and swearing to do everything he could to bring about peace.143  
Anticipating the likely accusations, Ocalan also stated that he had not been tortured or harmed by 
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the Turkish authorities.144  His statements shocked everyone; many saw them as utter betrayal of 
everything he and the PKK has stood for.145  Though much of the party publicly stood behind 
Ocalan, the statement deeply impacted the PKK leadership, creating divides and even causing 
some to leave the party altogether.146  
As anticipated, the court found Ocalan guilty of treason in June 1999.  That same month, 
the Turkish government sentenced him to death.  Soon after the verdict, in August, Ocalan 
ordered the PKK to cease attacks and withdraw to northern Iraq, implementing a unilateral 
ceasefire that would officially last until 2004.  He also orchestrated the surrender of several 
groups to the Turkish government; unfortunately, despite requests for an amnesty bargain, the 
government arrested the majority of those who handed over their weapons.147  The government 
and the military also continually refused to negotiate with Ocalan. 
After these monumental shifts, the PKK struggled to find its footing, suffering from 
internal rifts and crises of leadership for some time after Ocalan’s arrest.148  It went through 
several name changes, branding itself as KADEK and Kongra-GEL, before returning to its 
original moniker in 2005.  The majority of the violence that would occur over the next few years 
was primarily the result of protestors clashing with police or Turkish forays into Northern Iraq, 
rather than terrorist attacks.149  The PKK continued to claim Ocalan as its leader, though Murat 
Karayilan became the field commander in Northern Iraq, nominal second in command and de 
facto military leader of the organization.  In other arenas, Kurdish political parties operated with 
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apparent independence in the Turkish political system despite continuing allegations of 
collaboration with the PKK. 
 
The Fight to Survive 
While the PKK adjusted to its new reality, the Turkish state was undergoing its own 
shifts.  In the 2001 parliamentary elections, the socially conservative and moderately Islamist 
Justice and Development Party/Adalet Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) came to power by a large margin, 
propelled by an odd coalition of liberals and social conservatives.  Among other positions, AKP 
was aggressively in favor of accession to the European Union.  Consequently, it passed a great 
deal of legal reform in their first years in office to modernize Turkey’s legal code to comply with 
the Copenhagen criteria.  This reform included the abolition of the death penalty, and the 
subsequent commutation of Ocalan’s sentence to life imprisonment.   Military rule was also 
lifted in all of the OHAL provinces, though the military’s presence remained strong.  The AKP 
also attempted to address the conflict, although it was not until the last few years that it 
demonstrated willingness to negotiate with the PKK.  These developments will be addressed in 
greater detail later; however, actions such as the Oslo Protocol, the Democratic Opening and 
continuing negotiations with Ocalan have all been significant examples of AKP reaching out to 
both the PKK and the broader Kurdish population.  
Unfortunately, certain problems persisted.  Criticism of Turkey’s policy towards the 
Kurds often led to arrests on charges of supporting separatism and insulting the Turkish state.  
Kurdish MPs continued to be arrested and detained, as well as civil activists and advocates of the 
Kurdish cause.  AKP continued to refute the possibility of negotiating with the PKK, even as the 
ceasefire unraveled.  Economic and social disparities continued to disproportionately affect 
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Kurds from other segments of the population, particularly in large cities.150  Finally, the EU 
continued to label PKK affiliates as terrorist organizations, which had implications for both 
supporters and financial assets abroad. 
In September 2003, the PKK announced the imminent end of the ceasefire, citing the 
government’s failure to grant Kurds greater political and cultural rights and the military’s 
continued pressure on PKK sanctuaries in northern Iraq.151  The ceasefire officially ended in 
June 2004, though violence had been gradually increasing since the September announcement.152 
This time, there were groups claiming to be unaffiliated with the PKK, operating exclusively in 
the west and focusing on civilian targets, such as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK).  In 
response, the persecution of Kurdish politicians and human rights activists picked up again; the 
government put fifty-six mayors of towns in the southeast for aiding and abetting terrorism in 
September 2006.153  By 2007, many observers were reporting that the violence had reached 
levels not seen since the 1990s.154   
However, though the violence may have increased again, there were now different 
dynamics at play.  Following the US invasion of Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) in the north gradually gained autonomy, bringing the tantalizing hint of a Kurdish state 
for the first time since the Treaty of Sevres.  The AKP continued its apparently democratizing 
reforms, including the curbing of extrajudicial killings and torture.  It ultimately entered a power 
struggle with the military that culminated in the conviction of hundreds of former officers, 
significantly curbing the military’s influence in politics.  Continued accession negotiations with 
the EU applied pressure to the government to conform to international human rights standards as 	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well.  Finally, the government still held Ocalan, who has continued to advocate for peace.  He 
declared ceasefires throughout the period, including in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2013.  In 
contradiction with their publicly stated policy, AKP began to negotiate with Ocalan almost 
immediately after its election.155  News of the failed “Oslo Process” was leaked in 2009, making 
the negotiations public knowledge.  The current round became public in an interview with Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in December 2012.156 
There are still a host of issues on the table.  Recent AKP reforms have been condemned 
as not going far enough, and Prime Minister Erdogan has vacillated between a willingness to 
negotiate and the state’s traditional obstinacy.  Kurdish politicians and activists continue to find 
themselves under arrest, particularly after the protests of summer 2013.  However, with 
negotiations ongoing and a persistent ceasefire, AKP still might have the opportunity to end 
three decades of conflict.  An understanding of the PKK’s aims and its willingness to negotiate 
has never been more important.   
 
PKK Organizational Structure 
In order to examine PKK decisions, this paper assumes that the party possesses a centralized 
decision-making structure capable of communicating its directives and objectives across large 
distances.  Given the lack of information about PKK internal structure, it is impossible to 
confirm such a structure exists; however, through examining the organization and extrapolating 
from other, similar organizations, there is ample proof for this assumption. 
First, as was briefly mentioned before, Marxist-Leninist organizations like the PKK 
traditionally have a strong and centralized leadership, organized around authoritarian 	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principles.157  For the PKK, this ideological impact is intensified by the central role of Abdullah 
Ocalan.  As mentioned previously, Ocalan was among the PKK’s founders and, in its early years, 
solidified his control by rooting out dissent.  In addition to allegations that he has many of his 
rivals assassinated, there are also numerous anecdotal examples including his wife, Kesire 
Yildirim; former PKK commander Halil Kaya; the former coordinator of the Academy in 
Beka’a; and other popular figures within the PKK.   The initial levels of dissent demonstrate that, 
though Ocalan’s strength of personality propelled him to power, it was not enough to keep him 
there.   
Ocalan certainly used violence, intimidation and coercion to consolidate and maintain his 
position of authority; such violence has earned him a reputation for megalomaniacal brutality.158  
However, prior to his arrest in 1999, Ocalan had not faced a serious threat to his power since 
1991.159  Even after his arrest, the PKK remained largely intact and under his control through 
PKK field commander, Murat Karayilan.  Today, orders relayed from his cell on Imrali still 
determine the PKK’s actions and agenda.  Ocalan’s continuing prominence and control over the 
organization demonstrates the changing source and nature of his support: had his power rested 
only in his ability to punish and intimidate, it would have decreased significantly during his time 
in prison. 
 Instead, for those PKK supporters growing up in the 1990s, the PKK and Ocalan have 
become inextricably linked; he is a figurehead, a symbol, and the party’s rightful leader.  Both 
prospective militants and supporters have known nothing but Ocalan’s leadership for over two 
decades and, since the mid-1990s, disloyalty to Ocalan has often been equated with disloyalty to 
the Kurdish cause.  Ocalan’s power no longer rested on intimidation, but on love and respect, a 	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trend that continues today.  Consequently, he retains the ability to communicate strategic 
objectives to the organization and trust that, using his written literature and their own experience, 
his commanders will be able to derive tactics consistent with centralized directives. 
Despite the precedent for centralized leadership and the unique importance of Ocalan, it is 
undeniable that, due to the nature of its activity, the PKK necessarily operates over an expansive 
space with limited communication.  This entails a certain degree of decentralization in the 
leadership structure.  This logistical constraint means that the PKK must have a critical mass of 
rational members capable of acting relatively independently.   As in any group, there are 
certainly irrational individuals who have climbed in the party’s hierarchy; however, the 
necessary degree of decentralization suggests that concluding that the PKK is a rational 
organization does not merely mean only Ocalan, but rather the membership more generally, is 
rational. 
Thus, the combination of Marxist-Leninist authoritarianism, Ocalan’s particular position, and 
the necessarily decentralized elements of PKK hierarchy support the assumption that the PKK 
has centralized, coherent strategies and tactics and is rational as a whole.     
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I hope to use the various tools at my disposal to better understand 
the actions of the PKK.  Whether its members are called freedom fighters or terrorists, I believe 
they are largely rational actors, whose behavior can be analyzed and explained.  This will not be 
true in every instance; I have already pointed out their hierarchical leadership as the likely result 
of charismatic personality and norms rather than conscious decision-making.  However, I will 
demonstrate overall trends over the last three decades of conflict, particularly as the PKK has 
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become an increasingly global actor and, arguably, the most prominent voice of Kurdish 
nationalism by adapting their strategy and tactics to better operate across different settings.   
My analysis will explore multiple facets of the issue, and will encompass three key 
subject areas: ideology, political tactics, and military tactics.  In Chapter Two, I will look at the 
PKK’s ideology, examining its ability to adapt aspects of its ideology to fit changing 
circumstances and attract public support.  The third chapter will delve into the PKK’s 
participation in Kurdish civil society, both directly and indirectly.  In this chapter, I will examine 
the PKK’s supporters and networks both in Turkey and in Western Europe.  Finally, the third 
chapter will move on to the PKK’s military tactics and the ways in which it has sought to 
legitimate its use of violence.  I will divide this analysis by geographic area, looking at the way 
these tactics differ in Southeastern Turkey, Western Turkey, and the European Union.  
In examining these subject areas and through qualitative and quantitative analysis, I hope 
to thoroughly explore the ways in which the PKK has strategized and adjusted its tactics to 
maintain its legitimacy and relevance over the past three decades. 
 	   	  
 	   40 
CHAPTER TWO: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY 
 
 Having determined that the PKK is a largely rational organization, capable of adapting its 
strategies and tactics based on circumstance, it is important to look at what exactly this 
adaptation looks like.  One area of strategic change that is particularly relevant is ideology.  
The PKK’s ideology has undergone a number of shifts since the organization’s founding 
in 1979.  These shifts have primarily acted either to justify and legitimize the PKK’s actions or to 
guide them.  Such changes came from two primary sources: some were consciously strategic, 
such as incorporating women’s rights or religion to attract certain key groups, while others 
caused strategic change, such as the PKK’s adaption of liberal, democratic ideals in the early-
1990s.  Understanding the strategies driving and following from ideological change is crucial to 
understanding the PKK’s strategic adaptation.   
This chapter examines some of the primary components of the PKK’s ideology, and the 
ways in which they have changed over time.  Aside from a nationalist core, much of PKK 
ideology is relatively flexible.  This leads some analysts to accuse the organization of lacking 
strong convictions.160  However, close analysis shows that the PKK’s flexibility in other areas 
only demonstrates the primary importance of its nationalist agenda.161  In order to pursue the 
primary goal, Kurdish nationalism, the PKK is able and willing to change other parts of their 
ideology, either as the party itself changes its mind or to deliberately appeal to different groups 
in society.  Michael Radu, who studies the PKK and other terrorist organizations in depth, 
describes these changes as the result of “astute political instincts and sheer opportunism.” 162  
The context and tone give his description clear negative connotations.  This ‘framing’ often 	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reflects strategic shifts, and can affect anything from rhetoric and long-term objectives to on-the-
ground tactics.  Fiona Adamson, whose studies focus on the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, 
examines this phenomenon in a more neutral light as “strategic framing.”163  Despite their 
different views, Adamson and Radu agree on the PKK’s unusual capacity to adapt its stated 
ideology in response to changing times, places, and political climates.164  
To more fully understand these changes, one must explore several key areas.  These 
include Marxism and liberalism, key factors in shaping the PKK’s overall agenda; the 
willingness to engage with the Turkish state, which has significant ramifications in the direction 
of the conflict; and the role of women and Islam, both of which have been instrumental in 
attracting groups to the PKK.  This chapter will examine each area’s contents, its origin, its 
strategic implications, and why the transition is significant.  
 
The Importance of Ideology 
Ideology at its most basic is the worldview and set of beliefs that underlie the decision-
making process of any group.165  The stated ideology of a group has two primary functions: a 
guide to appropriate action and a means by which to justify or explain those actions.166  Both 
theory and history demonstrate the importance of ideology when exploring the actions of the 
PKK and other similar groups, and the consistency with which it translates directly to action in 
areas like recruitment, branding, legitimization, and even military strategy.  David E. Apter, a 
prominent academic in the field, also notes the ability of ideology to promote authority and 	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solidify community.167  Both within organizations and in the image they project to the outside 
world, ideology is an important way of explaining and legitimizing its actions.   It also sends 
important messages regarding the way in which the group perceives itself and wants to be 
perceived by others.  The PKK has certainly used ideology to promote both its collective 
authority, and Ocalan’s individual political position.   
The other role of ideology is to guide action and decisions regarding both strategy and 
tactics. Apter notes the ability of ideology to “link…action and fundamental belief.”168  This 
often entails that a group’s actions must be consistent with its ideology in order for the group to 
be perceived as legitimate.  Consequently, ideology can have a distinct impact on concrete 
actions taken by a group, and on the strategy and tactics it chooses to endorse.  For example, 
later sections will discuss the ways in which the PKK’s adaption of liberal ideology may have 
contributed to its increased willingness to enter negotiations with the Turkish government. 
Ideology has two primary sources; most are some combination of the two.  They can arise 
organically as the result of a situation or similar experiences.  Apter refers to these as ‘primordial 
sentiments’, or loyalties and beliefs shaped by things like aspects of identity such as ethnicity, 
race, language, or tribe.169  Kurdish nationalism, for example, arose out of the oppression and 
marginalization experienced by many Kurds.170  According to Apter, nationalism is the ideology 
that best embodies these primordial or organic sentiments.171  Like Kurdish nationalism, other 
forms of nationalism often arise out of shared frustration and experience, rather than deliberate 
planning.   
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Not all aspects of nationalism have this organic origin.  Apter notes the ways in which 
ideology promotes and legitimizes the authority of an individual.172  Ideology based on 
primordial sentiment can also naturally promote authority, particularly within developing and 
consolidating communities.173  However, it is not uncommon for individuals seeking such 
positions to manipulate ideology for political and social gain.174   
Finally, Apter discusses the ways in which a group’s ideology changes over time.  He 
describes this process as maturation, as groups move from the initial ideals of rebellion to more 
pragmatic and practicality in their ideological tenets.  Such maturation is often the consequence 
of pressure on the organization to deliver as it becomes increasingly prominent; Apter describes 
the ways in which the “Robin Hood” role nationalist groups adapt early in their existence must 
eventually give way to some degree of bureaucratic priority system in order for the organization 
to retain its legitimacy.175 This shift to pragmatism is visible in the PKK particularly regarding its 
willingness to compromise and its perception of realistic goals.   
This chapter will examine some of the ways in which the PKK’s ideology has changed 
over time, both maturing organically or in a deliberate effort to increase the party’s legitimacy 
and authority within different segments of society, particularly regarding women and religion.  
Such efforts may involve the wholesale construction of ideology; however, it also may entail 
framing existing ideologies in ways that make Kurdish nationalism relevant to other issues, as 
was the case with women’s rights. Both sources of ideology has also had unexpected 
consequences for the strategies the PKK has employed, both in the actions ideology will or will 
not legitimize, and the priorities it defines. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Apter, “Introduction: Ideology and Discontent,” 18. 
173 Apter, “Introduction: Ideology and Discontent,” 22. 
174 Apter, “Introduction: Ideology and Discontent,” 23. 
175 Apter, Introduction: Ideology and Discontent,” 27. 
 	   44 
 
Marxism 
Marxism was a central component of PKK ideology from the start, and was instrumental 
in determining the party’s internal structures and initial approach.  Though not a calculated 
choice, the emphasis on Marxism also proved very appealing for the party’s target constituency, 
and legitimized a great deal of the PKK’s early violence.  However, its primarily role has been as 
a guide, helping to shape the PKK’s early actions and organization.  Thus, though it was not the 
result of a strategic choice, the PKK’s Marxist ideology had strategic implications. 
 
Content 
 The PKK’s exact brand of Marxism is a blend, combining elements of Maoism and 
Leninism to form core party beliefs and structures.  Two popular examples are the PKK’s 
leadership structure and its desire to begin its activity in the rural Southeast.  Observers often 
describe the PKK’s centralized and authoritarian leadership structure as Leninist, commenting 
that it was extremely similar to that of many other parties of the Turkish Left.176  This leadership 
structure has remained with the party through its present incarnation. The other concrete example 
is the PKK’s initial decision to move its activity to the countryside.  Mao emphasizes that 
revolutionary activity and guerilla warfare are “based on the masses of the people” particularly in 
the countryside.177  Therefore, PKK strategy was very much in keeping with the Maoist emphasis 
on popular rural mobilization.178  
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 Marxist anti-imperialism also influenced the PKK’s worldview.  Parts of this came from 
the Turkish Left of the 1970s, which emphasized the need to break away from Western 
domination and capitalism.179  However, the defeat of Soviet-backed Iraqi Kurdish groups led 
the PKK to take this ideology even further, denouncing any reliance on foreign powers.180  The 
party also saw this imperialism reflected, not only in Western domination of Turkey, but in 
Turkey’s domination of Northwestern Kurdistan.181  The PKK was therefore able to draw on the 
anti-imperialist vocabulary of Marxism in outlining their arguments against the Turkish state and 
justifying the case for Kurdish liberation.182  This proved a further justification of the PKK’s use 
of violence, both for potential members of the group, as well as outside audiences. 
 
Origins 
At the time of the PKK’s founding, the Political Left was a powerful force in Turkey, and 
any activist received a thorough education in Marx, Mao and Lenin.  Many of the early members 
of the PKK, a group that included Turks, came from other radical leftist parties such as Dev 
Genc.183  Ocalan, for example, spent time in prison following the 1971 coup for participating in 
protests organized by student-led Leftist organizations.184  The Left’s unwillingness to 
acknowledge the specific situation of the Kurds caused the PKK’s founders to believe that a new 
group was needed; when these individuals left their original organizations, they brought Marxist-
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Leninist ideals with them.185  Consequently, the PKK drew not only its membership, but also 
many of its key attributes from similar groups of the time, including its authoritarian leadership 
structure.186  Though unique in Turkey at the time of its founding, the PKK’s emphasis on 
Marxism is not entirely unusual in this; Apter notes that nationalism and socialism often coexist 
within the ideology of various groups.187  However, what distinguished the PKK from other 
groups within Turkey was its fierce and uncompromising focus on Kurdish nationalism.188    
 
Implications 
The PKK’s shift towards an emphasis on nationalism by no means indicated an 
immediate split with the rest of the Left.  Many of its founders remained active in other Leftist 
groups until the PKK’s official founding in 1979.189  Even after the PKK became a distinct 
organization and its membership entirely Kurdish, Marxism was a common ground on which to 
base alliances.190  The PKK maintained relationships with Turkish Leftist groups like Dev-Yol 
for many years thanks to these shared ideological tenets.191  After fleeing Turkey due to the 
impending 1980 coup, the PKK leadership also used this common ideology to form alliances 
with Palestinian and Lebanese groups such as Fatah, which provided training in Lebanon, and 
Black September.192 
 Though Marxism was not consciously incorporated to legitimize the PKK’s violent 
action, it was extremely appealing to the constituencies the PKK wanted to recruit.  For Kurds 
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living in rural southeastern Turkey, examples of class-based oppression were plentiful.   Wealthy 
landlords dominated much of Southeastern Anatolia economy, concentrating much of the land 
and other resources in their own hands.193  Though in much of Turkey land-ownership has 
become more democratic over time, today the southeast remains in what some academics call a 
semi-feudal state. 194  Illustrative of this feudalism is the ratio of landless families to landholders 
in the southeast, which remains twice as high in Southeastern Turkey as in the rest of the 
country.195  As late as 2000, three percent of landowning families continued to control 57.3 
percent of land in the Southeast, while the majority of agricultural workers operated in a 
sharecropping system.196  Many of these landlords had also made deals with the Turkish 
government to secure their own holdings and repressed local populations.197  Consequently, the 
Marxist-Leninist leanings of the PKK paired well with its nationalist aims.   
In addition, traditional tribal leaders dominated national and local politics, including 
those in opposition to the national government.  Most active Kurdish politicians and rebel leaders 
also came from these landowning families.198  Ocalan and other PKK leaders are unusual in not 
coming from prominent positions in the traditional tribal hierarchy.199  Marxism, therefore, 
offered the party leadership a source of legitimacy separate from the more traditional hierarchy.  
Thus, Marxism was extremely useful to the PKK. 
Many of the PKK’s early attacks in the late 1970s were calculated to support this claim to 
Marxism.  The group assassinated a number of wealthy, oppressive landholders and political 
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officials, who they referred to as ‘collaborators’.200  Attacking the wealthy and powerful testified 
to the PKK’s Marxist convictions, while the close relationship many of the same individuals 
enjoyed with the Turkish government and military made the targets attractive from a nationalist 
perspective as well.  Attacking such high-profile targets was also an excellent way to generate 
publicity, establishing the PKK on the radars government, local people, and other groups active 
in the area.201   It also legitimized the PKK’s violence with two mutually supporting narratives, 
one based on Kurdish ethno-nationalist goals, and the other drawing on Marxist antipathy for the 
wealthy and powerful.  
As this chapter briefly discussed earlier, the PKK’s Maoist-Leninist heritage manifests 
itself in the party’s leadership structure and its activity in rural Turkey.  Mao is insistent upon the 
need for a bold and imaginative leadership, despite logistical arguments for decentralization.202   
In addition, Mao stresses the need for this leader to concern himself foremost with organization, 
instruction and propaganda rather than military aspects of the struggle.203  These traits have all 
remained part of the PKK throughout its existence.  Ocalan is certainly a strong leader around 
whom the party’s hierarchy was centrally organized. In addition, even before his imprisonment, 
he stayed out of the physical fighting, focusing instead on instruction and appealing to the public.   
In addition, Mao emphasizes the importance of mobilizing rural populations, rather than 
focusing the struggle in urban centers.204 He offers concrete advice on ways in which to do this, 
including reliance on local supplies and organization; many such ideas later translated into 
concrete PKK tactics.205  Mao’s emphasis on the importance of educating and arousing the 
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people is clearly seen in PKK tactics throughout their fight, and offers a clear example of the 
concrete implications of broader ideology. 
 
Significance 
Marxism was an initial component of the PKK’s ideology that shaped its priorities and 
guided its actions from the start.  It also manifested itself in several concrete aspects of strategy, 
including the PKK’s rural focus, which reflected a Maoist interpretation, and its highly 
centralized leadership structure.   The adoption of Marxist ideology was not the result of strategic 
calculation, but rather the inevitable influence of the Leftist movements of the 1970s from which 
the PKK founders emerged.  Initially, it was also extremely attractive to key PKK constituencies, 
helping to legitimize early instances of violence.   
However, changing global circumstances meant that by the start of the 1990s, Marxism 
was no longer as useful, causing the PKK to deemphasize this initially dominant ideology.  The 
early 1990s brought major changes that likely impacted this movement away from Marxism.  
The first was the end of the Cold War.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no 
longer a strong counterpoint to NATO’s emphasis on self-determination and freedom, and 
therefore much less available ideological and material support available to Marxist groups.  
These groups also became increasingly unimportant in a post Cold War world.206  The second 
key change was the PKK’s expansion into the European Union as it became increasingly 
involved with the EU’s Kurdish diaspora.  In the West, phrases like democratic governance, 
human rights, and self-determination dominate conversation.  In order to effectively appeal to 
European politicians and their constituents, the PKK chose to shift its focus.  Thus, broader 
political trends clearly motivated the party’s movement away from Marxism. 	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The PKK’s Marxist emphasis decreased throughout the early 1990s, a process that 
culminated at its 1995 Party Congress.  At the Congress, the PKK leadership voted to officially 
remove the hammer and sickle from its flag.207  Though the PKK was adamant that this did not 
signal a wholesale ideological shift, this did signal the end of the organization’s publicly avowed 
Marxism.208  Though strains of Marxism remain visible in PKK ideology and rhetoric, its 
primary emphasis has shifted in order to adapt to the changing world order. 
 
Liberalism 
The increased need to appeal to Western liberal sensibilities as a result of broader geopolitical 
trends prompted the PKK’s shift to an ideology based on liberal democratic values.  However, 
their continued reliance on authoritarian leadership structures reveals that this change was the 
result of pragmatic and strategic decision, rather than genuine conviction. 
 
Content 
Since 1995, the PKK has increasingly framed its goals in terms of the rights of self-
governance and self-determination.  The organization’s literature describes itself as “the key 
to…democratization in Turkey.”209  Murat Karayilan, the PKK’s current field commander, stated 
in a recent interview that only a process involving “reasonable, fair demands that really base on 
democracy, fair sharing and superiority of law” would solve the issues at hand and calling on all 
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involved parties to “take violence out of the political arena.”210  This rhetoric is a stark contrast 
to both the PKK’s persistent public image and its founding ideology.   
Economic inequality is still a key issue and has remained a central part of PKK rhetoric.  
Rather than using a Marxist vocabulary to describe Kurds’ historical marginalization, however, 
Ocalan frames it as an exclusion from economic relations based on ethnic discrimination.211  The 
PKK’s material emphasizes that part of the solution is returning economic sovereignty to 
Turkey’s Kurdish citizens through appropriate institutions and democratic self-governance.212  
While the material certainly mentions the class differences so central to Marxism, it also ties 
economic inequality to insufficient women’s rights, a lack of democracy and an overbearing and 
dictatorial state.  The PKK has maintained its focus on the importance of economic inequality 
that is so central to Marxism, rephrasing it as a precondition for democracy.   
 
Origins 
 The PKK’s decision to shift their focus to liberal values and ideals reflected a larger trend 
throughout Turkey.  As mentioned previously, as the Cold War ended and Turkey emerged from 
the aftermath of its 1980 coup, the emphasis on liberal values and democracy was visible across 
the spectrums of Turkish politics.213  
Despite the presence of an obvious rhetorical shift, the PKK has crafted a narrative in 
which democracy and self-determination were always the cause.  In one of the many books he 
wrote in prison, Ocalan outlines the founding tenets of the PKK using a liberal democratic 	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vocabulary, rather than Marxist terms.  He states that the founding of the PKK was a response to 
the Turkish state’s repeated denial of the Kurdish population’s right to self-determination.214  
Though these were not the terms that the PKK initially used to discuss their goals and 
motivation, Ocalan asserts that it is possible to recognize these liberal principles in the PKK 
founders, though the party did not publicly espouse such ideals until after its 1995 Congress.215    
Such assertions have played well in international media.  However, despite their rhetoric, 
it seems more likely that the PKK’s apparent change of heart was more an effort to legitimize its 
participation in the political process than the result of genuine convictions.  One key indication 
that this shift in values was a primarily strategic move related to appealing to public opinion 
comes in the PKK’s leadership structure.  The party continues to organize itself around the 
Marxist-Leninist structures of the 1970s.  Even Ocalan’s writings recognize the significant 
contradiction between the PKK’s democratic ideals and its extremely authoritarian and 
hierarchic organization.216  His acknowledgement of this conflict has not prompted internal 
reform, but it is an attempt to publicly recognize the internal tension between the PKK’s liberal 
rhetoric and its authoritarian internal structures.  The group’s lack of internal democracy speaks 
to the strategic nature of their commitment to democracy: they are not so devoted as to reform 
their own governance structures.   
 
Implications 
 This ideological shift did not prompt strategic change; rather, the change was itself the 
result of a strategy to help the PKK adapt in the post-Cold War world.  The new emphasis on 
democratic values enabled the PKK to more easily reach the ears of policy makers and a more 	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global audience.  It also provided access to a network of organizations working to promote 
human rights, rather than fighting the marginalization that increasingly handicaps many Marxist 
groups.217  This was particularly true as the PKK increased its presence and activity in Europe, 
which will be explored further in Chapter Three.  
 The adoption of values like democracy and human rights also had potential implications 
for the PKK’s use of violence.  Unlike Maoism or Leninism, liberal values do not emphasize the 
virtue of violent struggle.  In addition, alliances with human rights groups also put pressure on 
the PKK to limit their use of violence. While the PKK by no means abandoned their violent 
tactics with the shift to more liberal ideology, it is certainly possible that the party found it 
increasingly difficult to legitimize the large-scale violence against civilians common throughout 
the 1980s.  This may have impacted the party’s increasing willingness to compromise with the 
government, discussed in the next section. 
It is important to recognize that the presence of strategic adaptation and the utility of 
liberal ideals do not preclude genuine convictions among the PKK or its supporters.  Both are 
possible, particularly in generations of PKK recruits who joined the party in the years after this 
ideological shift.  It is entirely possible that liberalism now acts as a guide for many such 
individuals or even for parts of the broader party.  In addition, it may genuinely legitimize the 
PKK’s increasing turn to participation in more traditional political action. 
 
Significance 
Fiona Adamson, who studies PKK activity among the diaspora in Western Europe, notes 
in her work that the introduction of liberal values is perhaps the most significant example of the 	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PKK intentionally changing the framing of its objectives in order to thrive in a changing 
context.218  In the wake of the Cold War, and the destruction of other Leftist groups in Turkey, 
more allies available in the quest for democracy rather than a Marxist utopia. The persistent lack 
of democracy within the PKK indicates the strategic nature of the shift: a genuine newfound 
devotion to democratic ideals would have included moving away from the party’s undemocratic 
leadership structure.  Though the PKK’s primary ethno-nationalist objectives have not changed, 
the terms in which it has framed these goals has changed in order to continue to legitimize its 
actions and ensure that it remains a relevant political actor. 
  
Compromise 
Over time, the PKK’s willingness to enter talks and compromise with the Turkish state 
has increased.  Some of this is due to the increasing discussion of liberal ideals and importance 
of democratic processes, as the previous section touches on, and their ability to guide the party’s 
actions.  However, some of this change is due to conscious valuation of the political rewards of 
doing so.  While this increased willingness seems to be the result of the desire to maintain the 
party’s legitimacy amidst changing circumstances, it has also influenced both party and 




Despite their reputation for pursuing solely violent avenues of resource, the PKK has 
over time demonstrated an increasing willingness to communicate in a more nonviolent manner.  
Since the early 1990s the PKK has declared repeated ceasefires, reaching out to the Turkish state 	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for negotiations and peace talks.  Ocalan has stated multiple times that, “the revolutionary 
struggle can turn into an acquisition of humanity only through a qualified negotiation 
process.”219  In other words, while the threat of military force remains important, that force is 
only a first step: it is through negotiation and compromise that a lasting solution will be reached.  
This demonstrated willingness to pursue nonviolent avenues of conflict resolution has 
increasingly been part of both PKK rhetoric and action. 
 
Origins 
As observed in the previous chapter, those who study the PKK often see 1999 and 
Ocalan’s arrest as a watershed moment in many aspects of the group’s history, including the 
PKK’s stated willingness to negotiate and work towards peace with the Turkish state. 220  
However, though the need to maintain legitimacy and relevance was certainly made more urgent 
by Ocalan’s arrest, particularly on an individual level, the desire and efforts to ensure this 
legitimacy predated the arrest. 
The conciliatory nature of Ocalan’s opening statement at his May 1999 trial took many of 
his long-time supporters and allies by surprise.  Among his many shocking statements was the 
pledge to “serve [the Turkish Republic] for peace and brotherhood.” 221   Many longtime PKK 
members felt betrayed by statements as their leader acknowledged of Turkish soldiers killed in 
the conflict as “honorable martyrs” and stated his desire to pursue, not separatism, but peace, 
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brotherhood, and democracy.222  These members, as well as many outside analysts, perceive 
these statements as an abrupt and unheralded shift. 
However, careful analysis shows that this was not the case.  While his opening statements 
certainly demonstrated a change in the tone and intensity of Ocalan’s stance, it did not come 
entirely out of nowhere.  Instead, it was the culmination of a gradual softening, and arguably 
maturation, in his position beginning in the early 1990s.223  It is important to discuss three 
concrete ways in which observers and journalists have traced this change. 
In regards to negotiation and prospect of compromise, the organization has not been 
monolithic.  Ocalan has been a visible driver of change, sometimes publicly acting unilaterally, 
and its most visible spokesperson.  Though the PKK issued a statement during Ocalan’s trial 
stating its desire to work towards a democratic solution, this did not reflect true consensus.224 
PKK suffered from a divided leadership and struggles over the direction of the organization for 
several years after Ocalan’s capture.  Many perceived Ocalan’s statements as a capitulation to 
the Turkish government, and his orders for a ceasefire as coming the military they had fought for 
over a decade.225  Mehmet Can Yuce, a longtime influential figure, was one of several 
imprisoned PKK leaders who renounced Ocalan in the wake of his statements.226  Ocalan’s 
brother temporarily left the PKK to found his own militant group.227  Others, including Huseyn 
Topgider, a twenty-two year veteran of the PKK, sought political asylum in Europe.228   
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Despite the presence of many critics and significant splits within its leadership, the PKK 
as an organization ultimately stood behind Ocalan.  At its 7th Congress in 2000, the party 
explicitly approved of Ocalan’s shift and affirmed his position as its eader despite his 
imprisonment.229  There are also other, more concrete indications that the PKK as an 
organization has ultimately come to see the need for compromise.230  For example, the PKK has 
adhered to ceasefire orders since Ocalan’s imprisonment, indicating that, though the moderation 
of the PKK’s initial uncompromising stance is often driven by Ocalan, his statements are also 
congruent with the group’s outlook.   
 
Implications 
The PKK’s terrorist activity overall has declined significantly from its peak in the late-
1990s.231  The party no longer endorses suicide-bombing tactics, and the proportion of civilian 
casualties has declined significantly.232  These developments will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter Four.  One can best examine this shift, however, in three areas: the PKK’s demand for 
independence verses autonomy; its willingness to call and honor a ceasefire; and its willingness 
to enter into negotiations with the Turkish government. 
The shift in the PKK’s demands from an independent state to an autonomous region 
within Turkey is one demonstration of this gradual shift.  One persistent misconception about the 
PKK is that its stated goal is an independent Kurdish state.  This was certainly true at the time of 
the party’s founding: throughout the PKK’s early years the party saw any attempts to 
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compromise as betrayal.  In 1989, for example, Ocalan condemned Iraqi Kurdish leader, Jalal 
Talabani, for his willingness to settle for an autonomous Kurdish state, rather than one that was 
fully independent.233  Though there were undoubtedly other factors involved, Talabani’s 
willingness to moderate his demands was the explanation for a cancelled agreement between the 
PKK and Talabani’s group, the PUK.234   
Today, PKK literature goes out of its way to explicitly refute this assertion, stating 
explicitly that it “does not derive the creation of a Kurdish nation-state form the right of self-
determination.”235  Ocalan has also specifically pledged that the PKK does not “[seek] new 
political borders” but rather a solution that works within the existing national boundaries. 236  
While such statements certainly increased in frequency and volume after 1999, Marcus and 
others argue that they were part of the PKK discourse long before Ocalan’s arrest.  In a 2013 
article for Foreign Policy, for example, Jake Hess observed that, contrary to popular belief, the 
PKK has not demanded a separate state since the early 1990s.237  
The multiple ceasefires called in the last decade in the hopes of negotiating with the 
Turkish state are another useful indicator.  A willingness to momentarily forego violence is 
arguably both the strongest indicator and ramification of this strategic shift.  The PKK declare its 
first official ceasefire with the Turkish state in the spring of 1993, arguably the period when they 
reached the height of their military power.238  Evidence indicates that this gesture was in 
response to statements made by then-President Ozal that hinted at a willingness to begin talks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Marcus, Blood and Belief, 123. 
234 Marcus, Blood and Belief, 123. 
235 Ocalan, War and Peace in Kurdistan, 31. 
236 Ocalan, War and Peace in Kurdistan, 31. 
237 Jake Hess, “Turkey’s PKK Talks,” Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel, 8 January 2013. 
238 Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 26. 
 	   59 
with the PKK.239  Unfortunately, it was also the day before President Ozal suffered a fatal heart 
attack; though his successor made some gestures towards the PKK, Ozal’s death marked the end 
of any real chance at reconciliation.240  Interestingly, Ocalan kept the ceasefire in place for over 
another month.  Such decisions can be viewed as evidence that Ocalan’s opening statement was 
not an abrupt about-face, but rather an opportune moment to further a long-time trend of 
expressed willingness to work towards a negotiated peace.  This is certainly how Ocalan chooses 
to present events, emphasizing his willingness to compromise with Ozal.241  
Even those who believe that Ocalan’s position towards the government began to soften in 
the early 1990s acknowledge that there was a dramatic shift after his arrest.  Ocalan continued to 
call for peace and brotherhood from his cell on Imrali, calling for ceasefires in 1999, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2010, and 2013.242  This was a dramatic shift from the man who proclaimed in 1977 “the 
highest form of rebellion is armed rebellion.”243  The PKK as a whole largely respected these 
ceasefires, demonstrating that the shift was not Ocalan’s alone.  
Even more telling than ceasefires was Ocalan’s willingness to participate in negotiations 
with the government.  The first occurrence of this was in 1993 with President Ozal.  After Ozal’s 
sudden death, negotiations did not start again until after Ocalan’s arrest.  Though it has become 
clear that Ocalan was involved in talks with Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization/Milli 
Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT) since his capture, these negotiations did not become public for some 
time.244  In 2011, a tape was leaked that revealed ongoing conversations between PKK 
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negotiators and the government both at Imrali and in Oslo, Norway.245  Though rumors of these 
talks had been circulating prior to the 2011 leak, there was no evidence.246  It is unclear who 
provided this evidence; there are many parties who could have gained an advantage from its 
distribution and nobody claimed responsibility.  However, the leak revealed an ongoing shift in 
the dynamics between the PKK and government interlocutors.  Since 2011, both the Turkish 
government and Ocalan have been open about times when negotiations are ongoing.247  The 
public negotiations now occurring since Ocalan’s capture demonstrate the implications of this 
change in ideology.  
 
Significance 
Despite the PKK’s words and actions, many still doubt the sincerity of its interest in 
compromise with the Turkish government.  The ceasefire from 1999 to 2003 certainly served as 
a time for the PKK to reorganize and reemerge as an influential organization. Arguing that was 
the organization’s only intention, however, ignores the failure of the Turkish state to provide 
opportunities for political engagement. It is impossible to know whether the PKK would have 
returned to violent tactics anyway; however, it is a compelling counterfactual.  Still others argue 
that the shift is real, but that it is evidence only of Ocalan’s opportunism, self-absorption and lust 
for power.248  Significant skepticism remains regarding the veracity of the PKK’s stated 
willingness to pursue negotiations and its motivation for demonstrating a less harsh stance.   
Whether the PKK’s increased efforts s to compromise originated with genuine conviction 
or simply the recognition it would help the party retain its prominent position in the fight for 	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Kurdish rights, the party has demonstrated increased distance from its initial absolutist positions 
regarding the need for independence, the supremacy of violence and the moral failing of 
compromise.  The PKK’s public statements and participation in official negotiations and 




Marxism, Liberalism and compromise have been key parts of the PKK’s history and self-
image.  Other key strategic shifts concern more peripheral areas of the PKK’s ideology, such as 
its view of the rights and role of women.  Since the early 1990s, women’s rights have 
increasingly featured in PKK ideology.  While this advocacy may be the result of genuine 
convictions, it has also been intentionally framed to attract women to the PKK, as incorporating 
women is an extremely effective means of maximizing limited resources.  Regardless of the 
initial motivation, the decision has had significant ramifications both for the PKK and in other 
aspects of Kurdish society.  
 
Content 
The PKK describes the deplorable situation of women in Kurdish society at some 
length.249  Their written material describes women’s “lack of freedom, economic inability, lack 
of education, and health problems” as key elements of the oppression of women and children.250  
Ocalan in particular emphasized the need for the Kurdish movement to liberate women, and the 
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importance of women to the broader movement and the PKK specifically.251  This opened the 
doors for women to participate not only within civil society, but as fighters and leaders within 
the PKK. 
 These texts also tie the plight of women to the broader struggle for Kurdish rights, 
arguing that this oppression is caused by the lack of political and moral rights in society.252  
While discussing the actions of Kurdish men, such rhetoric also traces the ultimate blame for 
women’s oppression to the Turkish state.  The chosen vocabulary also emphasizes the parallel 
nature of these struggles, referring to marriages in Kurdish society as “old feudal 
relationships.”253  This reinforces the need for the PKK’s fight for Kurdish rights and freedoms, 
framing it within the context of women’s daily suffering.  The PKK’s framing has been 
successful.  One female BDP member recently described similarities between the mentality of 
the state and that of men in a news article, discussing how both result in oppression.254   
 
Origins 
 According to Ocalan, his views on women arose from seeing the way that highly 
conservative Kurdish culture treated women.  He has written a number of texts on the issue 
including one 200-page interview entitled “Killing the Man” and speaks about his horror at his 
own sister’s arranged marriage.255  In these, he presents the PKK’s focus on the women’s rights 
as the product of his own genuine convictions.  Whether or not this is true, the framing used in 
the party’s rhetoric is a clear example of strategic use of an issue to reinforce the primary fight 
for Kurdish rights. 	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There are many reasons to question Ocalan’s purported feminism: historically, minority 
groups have had to draw on their entire population, regardless of gender, in order to maximize a 
necessarily limited resource pool.256  The emphasis on women’s rights, therefore, may simply be 
a tactic to maximize the limited size of the pool of potential PKK recruits.  Though less common, 
the PKK’s female fighters are hardly unprecedented: other minority groups have also actively 
incorporated women, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also known as the Tamil 
Tigers or LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).257  Scholars also note that 
the PKK’s vocal feminism began around the time that the PKK expanded into urban areas 
through protest and publishing and, thereby, began to come into contact with more women.258  
Thus, there is a clear argument for the strategic nature of the PKK’s promotion of women’s 
rights.  In addition, the strategic use of framing to relate such issues to the Kurdish cause is also 
indicative of the party strategically using ideology as a recruitment tool. 
In addition to the strategic benefits of promoting women’s rights, experts also present 
arguments to belie the PKK’s professed concern for the situation of women.  One of the most 
prominent of these arguments is Ocalan’s troubled relationship with his ex-wife, Kesire 
Yildirim.259  There is, however, a significant difference between Ocalan’s wife and women who 
have joined the PKK over time, namely that many of the latter are utterly devoted to Ocalan.  His 
wife, in contrast, directly threatened his position of power.260  His split with her was in many 
ways consistent with his treatment of male members who posed a similar threat.  Thus, one 
cannot extrapolate Ocalan’s entire view on women from his relationship with his wife.  Others 
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raise allegations that Ocalan and other high-level commanders considered themselves exempt 
from rules banning members from romantic or sexual relationships.261   Unfortunately, there is 
no evidence of this.262  Therefore, there is minimal evidence to draw any conclusions regarding 
whether his rhetoric is the result of calculation or conviction.  Critics therefore argue that the 
PKK’s promotion of women’s rights is no thing more than a ploy, taking advantage of women’s 
limited options in a restrictive and highly patriarchal society to persuade them to pursue such a 
drastic course of action.263   
Another argument often employed against the PKK’s genuine feminism is the statistic 
that 55 percent of PKK suicide bombers have been female.  This draws a great deal of attention, 
as female suicide bombers are perceived in the West as an aberration, particularly in Turkey’s 
Arab neighbors.264   Critics therefore argue that the PKK is merely taking advantage of those 
most vulnerable in society to complete these suicidal missions. This is certainly an argument 
worth exploring; however, it is insufficient evidence to dismiss the PKK’s claims to feminist 
beliefs.  It is difficult to ascertain the motives of suicide bombers, male or female, and to judge 
who is being manipulated and, if so, how much.   
The discussion above demonstrates that while it is possible that the PKK’s advocacy for 
women’s rights arose out of genuine convictions, it is equally plausible that its support for 
women’s rights is entirely strategic.  In either case, the PKK framed the incorporation of 
women’s rights in such way that helped to maximize the PKK’s fighting force.  
 
Implications 	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Today, an estimated 18 percent of PKK fighters are women.265  In the early 1990s, at the 
peak of the PKK’s military power, as much as one-third of the PKK’s fighting force were 
women.266  These women have become a highly visible symbol of the party, and have garnered 
the party publicity in a number of mainstream Western publications. 267 Women are also not 
relegated to lower ranks: the PKK boasts all female units, female founding members, and has 
women sitting on its executive council.268  This high rate of female participation is certainly 
linked with the “feminist” values articulated in Ocalan’s writings and which the PKK now 
publicly holds.   
It has also had implications beyond on the PKK for women in broader Kurdish society, 
particularly in the Kurdish political parties.    Female PKK members do not come from a specific 
demographic, instead ranging from women fleeing poverty with the bare minimum of education 
to those turning away from careers made possible by their university degrees.269  For all of these 
women, families cannot refuse to let their daughters join the PKK for fear of appealing disloyal.   
This has opened up unprecedented options to women within other areas in highly 
conservative Kurdish society, particularly in the Kurdish political parties.270  The Kurdish Barış 
ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) also has high rates of female participation, and is the only party in 
Turkey that requires male and female party co-chairs. This has become particularly prevalent in 
contrast with Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi’s (AKP) conservative stance on women.271  Following 
the 2011 elections, 30.5 percent of BDP parliamentarians were women, the highest of any 
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political party and twice the parliamentary averages.272  In contrast, only 13.8 percent of AKP’s 
parliamentarians at the same time were women.273  The prominence of women in the BDP 




 Regardless of whether it started as a genuine conviction, women’s rights and issues have 
become an important part of the PKK’s ideology.  The PKK’s promotion of women’s rights has 
caused continued dedication to public female leadership and incorporation of women’s rights in 
public dialogue for Kurdish parties.  Women’s rights is an example of an area where it is unclear 
where the PKK’s convictions were initially genuine, or simply an attempt to maximize a small 
resource pool.  In either case, the Party consciously framed the issue in a way that explicitly 
connected the oppression of women and the oppression of the Kurds, in order to make the PKK’s 
fight relevant to women who wanted personal autonomy.  The decision to reach out to women 
has changed, if not attitudes, certainly options available for Kurdish women.  While it is 
important not to overstate this progress, it is still significant.  Described as a “movement within 
the movement”, female members of the PKK have certainly gained momentum that will not 
easily be reversed, regardless of the overall outcome. 
 
Islam 
Regarding many of the topics discussed above, it is unclear to what degree changes in rhetoric 
and ideology were caused by actual changes in belief or opinion, and how much the shifts were 	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themselves strategic.  In some areas, however, it is relatively obvious that ideological change 
was entirely for the sake of expediency, rather than genuine conviction.  One of these areas is 
religion, specifically Islam.  While none of the PKK’s leaders publicly demonstrate religious 
piety, the party has gradually increased efforts to explicitly attract and include Muslim 
supporters, largely in response to the increasing presence and importance of Islamist 
organizations both concerning specifically Kurdish issues and in Turkish politics more broadly. 
While Islam does not seem to have guided the PKK’s actions at all, it helps to legitimize the 
party’s actions and existence to a certain audience. 
 
Content 
 There is very little in the PKK’s stated ideology that deals directly with religion.  Though 
the party has increasingly taken action to appeal to religious groups in society, the associated 
ideological content is all but absent.  Islam is mentioned as an important component of society; 
however, the PKK is careful to remind supporters that their national and ethnic identity must 
always take priority over their religious identity.274   
 
Origins 
 Congruent with its Marxist outlook, the PKK initially completely dissociated itself with 
religion.  Surprisingly, they did not take a clear anti-religious stance; however, they did not 
cooperate with religious groups.275  In fact one of the PKK’s most bitter rivalries was with 
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Hizbullah276, an Islamist organization that employed similar terrorist tactics to pursue the goal of 
Kurdish independence.   
Perhaps the PKK’s neutrality was out of a desire to distinguish itself from Hizbullah.  
Through much of the early 1990s, Hizbullah was the PKK’s most significant rival within 
Kurdish society.277  The group espoused an agenda of Islamist Kurdish nationalism.278  However, 
many believe that Hizbullah was also supported by the state in an explicit attempt to destroy the 
PKK.279  
The decision to avoid discussing Islam may also have been out of pragmatism: though 
religion is an integral part of the social fabric in the southeast, the Kurds in Turkey are a 
religiously diverse group, with groups identifying as Sunni, Shi’ite and Alevi.280 The PKK 
clearly believe that loyalty based on common ethnicity trumps that springing from religious 
affiliation.281  Their decision to refrain from attacking religion may have simply been the result 
of a desire maximizing their pool of potential resources by continuing to draw constituents of all 
religions.  
By the mid-1990s, it became clear that silence was not sufficient.  At their Fifth Congress in 
January 1995, the PKK issued a statement saying that Islam was “not contrary to the Kurdish 
nationalist goals.”282  Following the Congress, the PKK also founded the Kurdistan Islamic 
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Movement (KIH), a group they deliberately backed and arguably controlled.283  By this time, the 
PKK no longer needed to distinguish itself in contrast to its religious rivals; Hizbullah effectively 
collapsed by the mid-1990s.284  
The growing presence of Islamist parties in government may also have been a factor. 
Many experts argue both the PKK recognized that Islamic parties also ran against the grain of 
mainstream Turkish politics, with both opposing the ideals of Kemal Ataturk and thus of secular 
Turkey.285  This commonality caused the PKK to perceive that Islamist parties in government 
might be more open to negotiation than their predecessors.  PKK may therefore have hoped to 
use these Islamic groups to reach out to Islamist parties in the Turkish government.   
In the early 2000s, the strength of religious groups became extremely evident again with the 
rise of the AKP.  The AKP was extremely popular in the religiously conservative southeast, on 
average claiming one-third of the vote in the southeast since its founding.286  In 2007, for 
example, when AKP hit the peak of their popularity in the region, they claimed 42 percent of the 
vote in Diyarbakir, close to the national average of 49.9 percent that carried AKP to victory.287  
While BDP remains the most popular party in the region, AKP is a close second and the only 
real threat.  Even after its popularity fellow prior to the 2011 elections, 32 percent of voters voted 
AKP.288  In contrast, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), the main opposition party, claimed 2 
percent of the vote.289  The continuing prominence of the AKP in Turkish politics indicates the 
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importance of Islam; however, the AKP has significantly stronger religious credentials than the 
PKK; appealing only to religious values could backfire. 
 This conundrum has been the key to understanding the PKK’s current position with 
regards to religion.  Their official statements make sure to acknowledge the importance of 
religious preferences and identity, while carefully balancing it against the reminder that it is the 
Kurdish cause, not Islam’s, which is supreme. 290  This careful balancing attempt seems 
engineered to balance the importance of constituents’ religion with the clear threat posed by the 
AKP and, at times, Hizbullah.291   
 
Implications 
 The strategic implications of this attitudinal shift have been extremely minor.  For 
example, the PKK has founded a number of Islamic organizations associated with the party to 
encourage the active support of more pious groups in Kurdish society.292  It has also supported 
the building of mosques in Western Europe as part of the network it has built to link the 
diaspora.293  In addition, the PKK has on occasion used religious rhetoric, including attempts to 
legitimize and justify for its messages and actions.294  Such efforts have focused on Sunni Islam, 
but works to build coalitions of affiliated Alevi groups as well.295  The need for only minor 
changes is perhaps in part why appealing to religious groups was such an attractive strategy: it 
was incredibly ‘cheap’ for the organization, requiring minimal action. 
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Significance 
 There is no indication that this shift in favor of Islam is the result of anything other than 
political pragmatism.  Ocalan is not a conspicuously religious man, nor is any other member of 
the PKK leadership.  Religion has also never been a central part of the PKK’s ideology; rather it 
has always been a clear add-on meant to attract still more supporters and avoid alienating 
religious constituents.  Finally, the emphasis on religion has clearly followed societal trends of 
the public importance of religion in Turkish culture.  Islam is one example of an instance when 
the ideological shift was itself strategic, rather than genuine, and the result, as opposed to 
producer, of strategy.    
 
Conclusion 
The PKK’s ideological shifts have both deeply affected its strategic decisions and been 
the result of strategic decisions.  This is best reflected in the core areas of Marxism, democracy 
and willingness to compromise with the central government, as well as the more peripheral 
issues of women’s rights and Islam.  In certain of these areas, particularly Islam, it is clear that 
the PKK intentionally changed their ideology in order to increase support for their core ethno-
nationalist aims.  This was particularly noticeable when it occurred in response to competition 
from other groups.  In other cases, it is unclear whether the ideological shift itself was genuine; 
however, it clearly guides strategy and actions; this is evident in the increased number of 
ceasefires between the PKK and the Turkish government in the last decade.  These strategic 
shifts in ideology have changed the ways in which the PKK’s fight is framed, particularly in 
terms of its stated goals and rhetoric, and in which it is conducted.  They are also illustrative both 
of the ways in which the PKK justifies its own actions, as well as the ways in which it seeks to 
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legitimize them for a broader public.  An examination of these ideologies is crucial in 
understanding both the causes and implications of strategic shifts throughout the course of the 
PKK’s fight.   
Ideology provides a compelling example of an area in which the PKK has adapted its 
strategy in order to operate effectively as circumstances changed.  Over time, there has arguably 
been an increasing tendency to embrace ideologies that are more practical and pragmatic, 
demonstrative of the organization’s ability to learn from past experience.  Thus, this chapter 
provides one example supporting my overall thesis, using the proof of rationality from Chapter 
One to move into a more detailed discussion of the party’s strategic decisions.  The next chapter 
will discuss the way in which the PKK adapts its tactics in traditionally political arenas. 
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND TACTICS 
	  
The previous chapter provided an understanding of the ways in which the PKK’s rational 
decision-making affects its strategy regarding ideology.  Ideology shapes a group’s identity and 
priorities: consequently, many of the strategic shifts in the previous chapter are related to 
securing legitimizing the PKK’s actions for a broader audience.  
The PKK’s tactics in the political arena are further proof of the organization’s ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances and appeal to different audiences.  This political activity has 
occurred both through direct action and through interactions with other political actors. This 
chapter evaluates these changing tactics within different geographical contexts, in order to 
account for the changing audience, available resources, and goals as the PKK moves from 
country to country. This chapter considers first civil society and politics first within all of Turkey 
and then in Western Europe.   
While one can find independent actors driving these efforts, the PKK has often directly 
used the resources of civil society in pursuit of its ethno-nationalist aims, including political 
parties, media outlets and civilian involvement.  In addition, it has at times used various tactics to 
influence or, arguably, co-opt various independent actors.  The connection between the PKK and 
legal organizations is often complicated; in frequently seeking to shut down legal parties through 
unsubstantiated accusations of collaboration with the PKK, the Turkish government makes these 
connections even more confusing.  It is important, therefore, to consider both the PKK’s direct 
efforts and its interactions with other social and political actors in order to more fully understand 
PKK tactics. 
Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, an academic whose work focuses on political activism in 
diaspora communities, draws a useful distinction between two types of political activity; though 
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her discussion pertains specifically to diaspora groups, the distinction exists in domestic politics 
as well.  Ostergaard-Nielsen distinguishes between institutional participation, or political action 
through established institutions and channels, and confrontational participation, challenging 
existing institutions from the outside through popular protest or alternative media.296  Another 
way to define the difference between the two would be to describe institutional participation as 
working from within the system, whereas confrontational participation seeks to impact the 
system from the outside.  One is not necessarily always more useful than the other; the two 
attract different types of participants and different types of attention and are useful in different 
ways.297  In Turkey, for example, the opportunities for institutional participation by explicitly 
Kurdish parties are limited, while Europe’s more open structures have provided more space for 
PKK involvement.  Used effectively, both types of participation can enable and even strengthen 
the other, and the PKK has often used such both either together or in parallel.  This chapter will 





Within Turkey, there have been multiple efforts to address the Kurdish Question through legal 
means and without the use of violence.298   The PKK has consistently been involved directly and 
indirectly with both institutional and confrontational political action in Turkey.  The exact extent 
of this involvement and the nature of relationships between the PKK and legal organizations and 
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parties are difficult to ascertain; however, this existence of this involvement and the influence of 
the PKK are undeniable. 
 
Background 
Due to restrictive policies and active attempts to shut down dissent, much of the progress 
made within Turkish civil society and politics regarding Kurdish nationalism and rights has been 
unsatisfactory.  Despite difficulties, there has been a relatively consistent positive trend since the 
first outspokenly pro-Kurdish politicians emerged in 1987.299  These politicians were not 
members of a party with an explicitly Kurdish agenda, but rather affiliated with the Social 
Democratic People’s Party/Sosyaldemokratik Halkı Partisi	  (SHP).  Ultimately, however, they 
realized they needed their own party: outspokenness on the Kurdish issue cost these original MPs 
their SHP membership.300   In June 1990, these MPs joined with others to form the first party 
explicitly addressing the Kurdish issue, the People’s Labor Party/Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP).301  
The party retained its leftist affiliation; however, its primary focus was on issues related to the 
Kurdish issues.  The party’s emergence was a turning point, marking the beginning of the 
Kurdish issue as an active presence in legal Turkish politics.302  
 Since the founding of the HEP, there has consistently been a single-issue Kurdish party in 
the Turkish political arena; between 1990 and 2013 there have been seven such parties, including 
HEP.  These parties have been represented in Turkish parliament with regularity and have also 
held local positions in the Southeast.  There are certainly instances and examples of state 
accommodations over that time; unfortunately, these have been few and far between.  The 	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primary reason why there have been so many Kurdish parties is because Turkey’s Constitutional 
Court banned all but the most recent from the political arena.303  Nicole Watts, who has studied 
Kurdish political parties in some depth, describes “continued state resistance to any overt 
demonstration of Kurdish political identity.”304   Though the court has had various legal 
justifications for each shutdown; the pattern of discrimination is unmistakable.  
In addition to shutting down the parties entirely, the state has also used other tactics to 
keep Kurdish political parties from functioning effectively.  The first of these is a clause in the 
Constitution mandating that, in order to be represented in Parliament, a party must receive a 
minimum of 10 percent of the vote nationwide. As a party whose constituency is very localized, 
a national threshold was impossible for Kurdish parties to meet.305  Consequently, Kurdish party 
candidates run as independents or as candidates of an allied party, before reconvening once in 
parliament.306  The threshold is one of the most visible indications of prejudice against Kurdish 
parties. 
Another of Turkey’s laws that had a great impact on Kurdish politicians is Article Three, 
paragraph two of the Turkish constitution, which bans the official use of any language other than 
Turkish.307 The practical ramification of this policy is that politicians cannot address their 
constituents in Kurdish without risking government reprisal; this response often includes 
removing politicians’ eligibility to run for office and even arrest and criminal persecution.308  
This has both practical and symbolic implications.  Practically, it hampers many Kurds from 	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participating in the political process in areas where Kurmanji or Zaza is the first language of 
most of the population.309  Symbolically, it is another clear indication of exclusion. Kurdish 
politicians often would prefer to address constituents in their native language, both to better 
share ideas and to express a common identity. The ban on the use of Kurdish languages and the 
government’s often-enthusiastic enforcement is another obstacle to the participation of Kurdish 
politicians and parties. 
 Another way in which the Turkish government prevents the efficacy of Kurdish parties is 
simply by arresting their members. The majority of these arrests were based on falsified charges 
or charges that lacked sufficient proof; however, that has not stopped Turkish courts from 
handing down long prison sentences or banning individuals from holding office.  For example, 
Leyla Zana, one of the most famous female Kurdish politicians and a two-time Nobel Peace 
Prize nominee, spent over a decade in jail due to allegations of PKK connections.  In another 
instance of clear discrimination, when an independent candidate in Diyarbakir beat an AKP 
candidate for a parliamentary seat in the 2011 general elections, the courts suddenly decided to 
uphold an old verdict that disqualified him from the election.310 The number of Kurdish 
parliamentarians imprisoned or banned from politics on very minimal proof is another 




Due to the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organization and the charges leveled against 
many of its members, its direct participation in institutional politics in Turkey has until recently 	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been difficult if not impossible.   Even after Ocalan’s arrest provided a potential vehicle for 
official participation in institutional politics, the abilities of the broader party remained minimal.  
It is therefore important to examine the ways in which the PKK has interacted with legal Kurdish 
parties to further its own agenda. 
 The connections between the PKK and legal political parties are complicated.  Initially, 
the PKK simply condemned all legal political parties.  When the single-issue Kurdish political 
parties first emerged, the PKK rejected them as well, warning civilians and politicians alike to 
stay away from the democratic process.311  PKK members were not hesitant to reinforce these 
warnings with violence.312  Analysts debate whether the vehemently negative response was about 
a competition for power or a fundamental distrust of the Turkish political system; the answer is 
likely somewhere in between.  Throughout the early 1990s, the PKK went back and forth 
between supporting these parties and threatening them.313 
 Any measure of PKK support complicated the identity of these parties, particularly in the 
eyes of the state.  Many in government already viewed these political parties as the “PKK come 
down from the mountains.”314  Throughout the last two decades, the government frequently 
accuses the parties of being PKK fronts, and supporting terrorism is a popular charge leveled 
against Kurdish politicians.315  Many of these allegations are supported with insufficient or 
falsified evidence, and are clearly acts of government repression.316  However, pictures of 
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Kurdish MPs embracing PKK fighters, as they did when a number of fighters returned to Turkey 
in October 2009 under an amnesty deal, provide visible support for such accusations.317   
Politicians explain such pictures with another complicating factor: due to the significant 
overlap in the PKK and BDP constituencies, Kurdish political parties need positive relations with 
the PKK to be successful.318  Perhaps the earliest example of this is Ocalan’s tentative statements 
in 1991 in support of the new HEP; as a result of his approval, the party found itself with a 
sudden exponential increase in membership and public support as a direct consequence.319 
Mahmut Kilinic, one of the HEP’s founding members, by nothing that while their methods and 
approaches differed greatly, ultimately PKK and HEP goals overlapped, explaining the large 
number of individuals who sympathized with both.320   
Thus, even as the Kurdish political parties explicitly decry any connection with the PKK, 
true independence is impossible.  The PKK’s ability to affect public opinion necessarily remains 
a key decision-making factor for these Kurdish parties.  Finally, the PKK’s ability to impact the 
key issues on which these parties focus also further intertwines the parties’ decision-making. The 
need for PKK approval complicates the legal issues surrounding Kurdish political parties. 
 The PKK has also actively reached out to legitimate political parties, as allies and even as 
the future of the Kurdish struggle.  Ocalan has stated that, as the fight for Kurdish rights must 
now continue in a democratic sphere, it is the BDP who “will take over this historical legacy” in 
order to turn a “revolutionary struggle…into an acquisition of humanity.”321  While this is 
certainly a positive sign of the PKK’s willingness to leave behind its violent tactics, it also 
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indicates an alignment of PKK and BDP goals, a problematic association.  Turkish media has 
accused the PKK of trying to co-opt the BDP and its predecessors on numerous occasions.  The 
PKK’s popular support and the government’s frequent accusations contribute to the unclear 
status of the relationship between legitimate political parties and the PKK.  This makes it more 
difficult to stop the Turkish government from shutting these parties down, and to understand the 
extent of the PKK’s influence over the legitimate Kurdish political parties. 
The PKK does have one avenue of access to formal institutional politics: Abdullah 
Ocalan.  Since his arrest and imprisonment in 1999, Ocalan has had the ability to speak publicly 
and negotiate formally with the government.  Obviously, those statements released are subject to 
some government screening; however, Ocalan’s word has been widely respected both by the 
PKK and by society at large.  It is arguably Ocalan’s presence that has made possible the series 
of recent ceasefires and negotiations, as he is able to speak directly with the government and 
MIT without fear of arrest.  In addition, one can speculate that Ocalan might be able to make 
larger concessions in negotiations both because of his immense popularity and because his time 
in prison, particularly when facing a death sentence, proves his devotion to the cause.  In either 
case, he is certainly politically influential.  Since restrictions were loosened on Ocalan’s visitors 
following the most recent ceasefire, many of Ocalan’s visitors have been BDP politicians.  
Particularly since active PKK fighters and commanders seem to follow his orders, Ocalan’s 
arrest opened up an unorthodox avenue of direct institutional political participation for the PKK. 
 Though direct institutional participation is largely unavailable, the PKK is nevertheless a 
participant in Turkey’s institutional politics, both because of necessary connections with the 
Kurdish parties and through their own efforts tot reach out to these parties.  Thus, though the full 
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extent of PKK involvement is unknown, it is important to note the points of contact and the ways 
in which they participate in institutional politics. 
 
Confrontational Participation 
The founding of the first Kurdish political parties and the consequent increase in formal 
institutional participation coincided with an increase in confrontational public participation from 
the broader public.  While the PKK and its leaders recognized the need for public support by the 
start of the 1990s, it was seen as an eventual goal rather than an immediate possibility.322  That 
changed in the spring of 1990 with what has become known as the Serhildan or Uprising.  In 
March, around Newroz, families in the city of Nusaybin took the rare step of claiming the bodies 
of thirteen PKK members ambushed and killed by Turkish forces.323  While the PKK had been 
pushing for families to do this more frequently, few did out of fear of angering the army.324  
When the police tried to prevent funerary processions for these fighters on March 14, 1990, the 
situation developed into mass protests that including an estimated 5,000 people.325   
These protests spread to other cities as well:  the next day in Cizre, another city in the 
southeast, an estimated 15,000 people took to the streets.326  The result was not peaceful 
demonstration, but violence between civilians and the police, as the police opened fire in several 
locations.327  In Nusaybin, security forces killed eight people and injured at least twenty-five.328  
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The government officially reported at least 300 arrests.329  In Cizre, at least five protestors were 
killed, eighty injured, and another 155 arrested.330  Nusaybin and Cizre were only two of many 
examples of this kind of protest, as evidenced by the government’s decision to impose martial 
law on the region in April and to step up the forcible migration of Kurdish citizens shortly 
following the Newroz protests.331 
These protests, the first of their kind in decades, took the Turkish government by 
surprise.  However they were not alone; the PKK was shocked to see this amount of urban 
support.332  The Serhildan was only the first indication of increasing Kurdish activism nominally 
independent of the PKK that took place during the early 1990s.333  The PKK responded quickly 
to their newly discovered public support; at their second conference in May 1990, the leadership 
determined that the organization was now ready to begin shifting its attention and its reach from 
rural areas into city centers with the intention of raising a general uprising.334  Following the 
1990 protests, Newroz celebrations became, and remain, a time of public protest among Turkey’s 
Kurdish citizens. 
Though the PKK certainly appreciated the value of the public support shown during the 
Serhildan, the extent to which it engineered either the initial protests or subsequent 
demonstrations is unclear.  PKK commanders active at the time report mixed signals from 
Ocalan, and, despite rhetoric from the Second Conference, there is no sign that it tried to 
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engineer a Kurdish intifada.335  Some of the aforementioned commanders suggest that this was 
due to the PKK’s Syrian hosts who had no desire to give their own Kurdish population any ideas 
about the possibility of revolt.336  Others state that it was Ocalan’s ego that prevented the 
Serhildan from having comparable influence, complaining that he feared that such sudden rapid 
growth would dilute his influence within the new popular movement.337   
Government attempts to suppress public protests were hugely unsuccessful.  Public 
protests have continued since the Serhildan; International Crisis Group (ICG) reports from two 
decades later detail numerous instances of similar protests in Diyarbakir and other cities.338  
Despite the passage of time, the government response changed little.  Methods of protest have 
also adjusted in the face of police brutality.  In October 2012, for example, shops, schools, and 
bus services in Diyarbakir all shut down during a one-day strike.339  Such strikes are a way to 
demonstrate dissent without risking the consequences of taking to the streets.  Public protest, in 
contrast, can mean arrest and prison time under the broad provisions of the Turkish Penal Code, 
or the police brutality many protestors reported in the summer of 2013.340  Hunger strikes are 
also a common form of protest, particularly among those imprisoned in Turkish prison.  As with 
the Serhildan, it is often extremely to determine whether the PKK is involved in the organization 
of such protests. 
The other key area of Kurdish confrontational participation in Turkish politics is the 
media.  Until 1991, publication in Kurdish languages was illegal within Turkey; however, many 	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organizations and journals continued to publish in secret.341  The same was true for the use of 
Kurmanji or Zaza on television and radio.  Even after softening restrictions in 1991 and partially 
lifting them under AKP, the government has often continued to object strongly to the content of 
Kurdish journals, which almost invariably contradicts official narratives regarding the conflict.  
Due to active efforts by the Turkish government to shut down such organizations, Europe was 
the hub for the majority of PKK media production.  Reports of Turkish military abuses, for 
example, rarely occurred in Turkish publications; however, the PKK was able to not only discuss 
these abuses, but also show proof in the form of photographs and video.342  Satellite television 
has also been an effective means of communication; whether or not the PKK controls the poplar 
Kurdish-language stations, its members and spokespersons frequently appear on the channels.  
Such stations are popular with constituencies from Village Guards employed by the Turkish 
government to members of rival Iraqi-Kurdish groups, PUK and KDP, despite its PKK 
connections.343  It is important to recognize the importance within Turkey of providing and 
distributing a narrative contradicting the stories told in Turkish media, over which the 
government exercised a great deal of control, or mainstream publishing, which largely neglected 
issues of specifically Kurdish interest.344   
The Turkish government ultimately realized the importance of television, actively 
pressuring European countries to shut down MED-TV, the earliest of the Kurdish satellite 
television stations.345  The government eventually relaxed restrictions on broadcasting in Kurdish 
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languages with in Turkey in 2009, launching a government-sponsored Kurdish language channel, 
TRT.346   Despite this, MED-TV and its successor stations ROJ-TV and Medya-TV, which have 
also been produced in Europe and linked to the PKK, continue to dominate Kurdish language 
television.  
A great deal of this confrontational political participation seems to have developed 
outside of PKK control, though it is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion.  While the PKK 
occasionally organized street celebrations for Newroz, there is little evidence that they planned 
the large and occasionally violent demonstrations that have often emerged.347  This 
confrontational participation, therefore, is not only an example of civic activism towards many of 
the PKK’s goals, but also of a case in which the level of PKK involvement and innovation are 
contested and ambiguous.  This true of media; however, despite ambiguity regarding control 
over the stations, the PKK has used them as a means of communication. For most large-scale 
public protest in favor of PKK goals the situation remains much more ambiguous; while the 
organization’s goals and ideology are clearly present, the extent to which the PKK has 





Although official political participation is difficult due to the party’s illegality, the PKK 
has consistently been involved in both confrontational and institutional politics.  While the extent 
of this involvement is at times difficult to ascertain, the PKK has dominated nonviolent political 
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activism in Turkey throughout its existence.  In addition, the type, intensity and means of this 




In order to sustain their fight within Turkey, the PKK has required significant support 
from abroad.  In fact, the PKK’s political activism in Europe is sometimes referred to as a 
“second front” in its fight, speaking to the equal importance of this component of the PKK’s 
strategy.348  The party’s deliberate cultivation of support among the European diaspora 
demonstrates its awareness of this importance from early in the conflict and its ability to adapt in 




The Kurdish population in Western Europe is made up of a combination of economic and 
political immigrants.  Many were Gastarbeiter349 who emigrated from Turkey under the 
permissive laws in the sixties and seventies seeking jobs.  Others sought political asylum, 
particularly after Turkey’s 1980 coup.350  To this day, many of the Turkish and Kurdish 
immigrants in Western Europe are not citizens of the countries in which they live, but rather 
remain Turkish citizens.  Many of those who have become politically active as members of the 
Kurdish diaspora did not start out that way: instead, their activism is the result of deliberate 
efforts to cultivate Kurdish identity among Turkish immigrants in Western Europe.351 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Alynna J. Lyon and Emek M. Ucarer, “Mobilizing ethnic conflict: Kurdish separatism in Germany and 
the PKK,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 No. 6 (2001): 928. 
349 German for “Guest Worker”: a term applied to Kurds and Turks who arrived in the EU throughout the 
1960s and 1970s under labor agreements between Turkey and Germany. 
350 Ostergaard-Nielsen, “Transnational political practices and the receiving state,” 266.   
351 Lyon and Ucarer, “Mobilizing ethnic conflict,” 933. 
 	   87 
It is important to note that the politically active groups discussed here are only a subset of 
the population. Estimates vary and clear membership numbers are difficult to attain.  One 1999 
estimate put PKK membership, that is to say active support rather than sympathy, at 11,000, or 
more than one in five Kurds in Germany at the time.352  Other estimates from approximately the 
same period put passive support as high as 90 percent.353  Regardless of the specifics, the number 
is certainly significant, but by no means does it constitute the entire population. 
 Many scholars have used the Kurdish population in Western Europe as a case study for 
the effects of a diaspora on civil conflict. Perhaps the most impressive of these scholars are Fiona 
Adamson, who looks at transnational networks, political mobilization, and violence; Alynna 
Lyon and Emek Ucarer, who focus specifically on the PKK in Germany; and Eva Ostergaard-
Nielsen, whose research concerns transnational political practices.  All of these researchers have 
used the Kurdish diaspora to shed light on some of the larger issues related to diaspora 
populations, while simultaneously providing insight into the actions of the PKK and other actors 
in the diaspora. Other often-studied diaspora groups include the Irish-American and Jewish-
American communities, both of which had a significant impact on the conflicts in Ireland and 
Israel respectively.  
Empirical research on these and other diaspora groups has found that their impact is not 
always positive.  Researchers at the World Bank have concluded that there is correlation between 
an involved diaspora and the recurrence or perpetuation of civil conflict.354  Part of this is about 
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the political stance of diasporas, which is often more radical than that of domestic groups.355  
Adamson attributes this more radical stance to the lack of accountability in the diaspora; they are 
largely unaffected by the consequences of perpetuating conflict.356  Other scholars have 
speculated that it is diasporas’ ability to contribute resources that tends to exacerbate and renew 
conflict.357  Ultimately, though there seems to be no single causal factor, civil conflicts that 
engage a diaspora are often at risk of prolonged conflict. 
This risk is offset heavily by the advantages a diaspora can provide to insurgent groups.  
The greatest utility of a diaspora in a given civil conflict is often linked with its access to the 
same resources that arguably prolong conflict.358  The PKK is no exception, relying heavily on 
the Western European diaspora for funding and recruits.  While some of this monetary support 
comes from illegal activity, allegedly including drug trafficking, smuggling, and extortion, 
academics who have studied the PKK in depth, including Eccarius-Kelly, have concluded that 
the PKK does not have the capacity to raise its capital solely through illegal means, particularly 
those heavily reliant on intimidation and fear.359  Therefore, a significant portion of financial 
contributions from Europe, if not the majority, must come from voluntary donations.360  
This section will discuss the ways in which the PKK mobilized the Kurdish community 
in the European Union to support their fight through a variety of mechanisms.  It will then 
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explore the implications of this mobilization and how it differs from the way in which the PKK 
and its supporters act in Turkey, given the different goals and political context. 
  While within Turkey, the legal status of the PKK is strictly defined, in the various 
countries of the European Union, it is a bit more contested.  The various Kurdish organizations 
through which the PKK in Western Europe are mostly legal: until its dissolution in 2000, the 
official European arm of the PKK, National Liberation Front of Kurdistan/ Eniya Rizgariya 
Netewa Kurdistan (ERNK),361 remained legal throughout much of its area of operations.  
Germany, the country in which the largest portion of the Kurdish diaspora resides, did not ban 
the organization until 1993 when it responded to a specific series of attacks.  Even then, officials 
were willing to relax the group’s designation as a terrorist organization and reclassify it as a 
criminal organization in 1998, based on the decrease in violence.362  The Netherlands, which has 
a smaller but nonetheless politically active Kurdish minority, allowed the organization to remain 
legal throughout the peak of violence in the 1990s.363  Turkey has lobbied for years for the entire 
European Union to classify the PKK as a terrorist organization and crack down on its activities; 
however its efforts have been largely unsuccessful.  Instead, the PKK’s legal status has been 
more dependent on its activities and the level of violence it brings within European countries.  
While making the organization illegal does not greatly hamper the PKK’s ability to operate, it 
does handicap its institutional political capabilities and therefore its relevance in a context in 
which violence is largely ineffective.   
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While there are certainly other significant actors in Kurdish diaspora politics in Western 
Europe, the PKK was able to create a political monopoly from early on.364  However, it is 
important to note that some of the same complications associated with linking groups to the PKK 
in Turkey also exist in Europe, albeit to a lesser degree.  While some of the organizations this 
chapter discusses are truly independent organizations, others are attempts by the PKK to 
maintain a legal base in a particular country when the group is made illegal under another name.; 
however, it is often difficult to distinguish one from the other. 
The PKK itself attempted to not only get around legal barriers, but to rebrand itself on 
numerous occasions over the past decade.  For example, the group changed its name to The 
People’s Congress of Kurdistan/Kongra-Gel in the early 2000s in an attempt to evade its 
historical reputation, and legal designation, as a terrorist organization.  These attempts have been 
largely unsuccessful; governments simply designate the newly named group as illegal as well.  
Ultimately, the party resigned itself to the moniker PKK for the foreseeable future.  However, the 
PKK’s attempts to rebrand area gain indicative of its understanding of the importance of public 
opinion and the different nature of politics in Europe, rather than Turkey.   
 
The Cultivation of Kurdish Identity 
 
The sense of common Kurdish identity was not something that early migrants initially 
brought with them.365  Their motivations, as discussed briefly above, were economic, rather than 
political.  Kurdish nationalism and common Kurdish identity were exported to Western Europe 
from Turkey.  Some of the chief carriers of this ideology were political refugees who fled to 
Europe after Turkey’s 1980 coup.366  Prior political refugees, including those who came to 	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Europe after the 1971 coup, identified first as Leftists, Marxists, or Maoists.367  In 1980, 
however, some of those who fled to Europe were PKK members, or at the very least, were 
familiar with the rising importance of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey.368  These activists worked 
to intentionally create collective Kurdish consciousness in the sizeable migrant populations in 
Western Europe, often explicitly with the agenda of creating PKK supporters.  
Their work was made easier by the fact that most Kurdish immigrants to Western Europe 
were members of a doubly marginalized population. In Turkey, their Kurdish identity meant 
their social and political exclusion, in addition to the economic hardship they often shared with 
ethnically Turkish migrants.  Once in Europe, they became a marginalized group yet again due to 
both cultural disparities with the native population and the effective limbo of their own identity: 
though the Gastarbeiter could become residents of Western Europe, the process was complicated 
and, consequently, they often remained Turkish citizens.369  In addition, Kurdish population in 
Western Europe faced consistent discrimination, even decades after their arrival; for generations 
born and raised in Europe, this dislocation has been particularly painful.370 
For new arrivals or individuals who felt out of place in their new country of residence, 
gathering points based on cultural identity were understandably attractive.  Beginning in the 
early 1980s, a network of nominally autonomous Kurdish organizations, cultural clubs, athletic 
organizations, and publications began to arise throughout Western Europe.371  It is unclear 
whether the PKK coopted or created this Kurdish cultural network; however, it quickly became 
clear that many of these organizations were affiliated with the PKK or ERNK.372  The PKK also 
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spread their message through media, using cassette tapes and video in the 1980s before moving 
into satellite TV and eventually the Internet.373  The PKK effectively used the public space 
available in Europe’s liberal democracies to create a network that supported its target population 
and cultivated a sense of Kurdish identity. 
To bring people through the doors of these organizations, the PKK actively used visible 
signifiers of common identity.  For example, a number of groups linked with the PKK regularly 
organized large Newroz celebrations.374  These celebrations were not inherently politically; 
however, they were part of this broader effort to cultivate and appeal to the common identity of 
immigrants in the Kurdish diaspora.  The PKK’s effective use of visible elements of common 
Kurdish identity enabled them to reach out to large segments of the population and further 
increase the presence of the distinct Kurdish identity. 
Language was another such tool.  The PKK actively promoted the use of Kurdish languages, 
particularly Kurmanji, through its use in literature and media.375  Particularly given restrictions 
on the use of the language in Turkey, this was an incredibly effective tool; it has also had lasting 
implications for Kurmanji.376 The literary corpus in Kurdish languages was not particularly 
sizeable when the PKK arrived in Europe in 1981, nor was it a widely used language outside 
parts of the Southeast; however, the number of Kurmanji speakers and publications increased 
perceptibly throughout the 1990s.377  Kurdish nationalist groups, many of which were affiliated 
with the PKK, were the driving force behind many of these publications, which proved 
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instrumental in spreading the language.378  These publications did not only include material 
relating to the conflict; rather, the corpus has come to include grammars, dictionaries, books on 
Kurdish history and culture, and novels, in addition to journalism.379  Martin van Bruinessen, a 
scholar of the Kurdish diaspora, stated in the 1990s that, due to these changes, “Kurdish has been 
enriched and sufficiently developed to serve as a vehicle for modern political and literary 
discourse.”380  With both the increased use of Kurmanji and the increased number of ways in 
which it could be used, came the spread of a common culture and identity.381  Kurdish nationalist 
groups, many of which were likely linked with the PKK, contributed greatly to this linguistic 
revival and the consequent spread of common Kurdish identity. 
Television was also played key roles in the growing Kurdish national consciousness across 
Europe.  Scholar David Romano argues MED-TV, the first major satellite station, may be the 
single most important promoter of Kurdish common identity in the twenty-first identity.382  
Beginning in 1995, MED-TV broadcast a wide variety of programming, including news, political 
debates, cultural programming, and children’s programs primarily in Kurmanji, Zaza, and 
Turkish.383  Though illegal in Turkey, as the only station with Kurdish language programs until 
2009, MED-TV and its successors quickly became popular stations.384   
For many of those who came to these into contact with the PKK, either through discussion or 
written publications, it had an inherently appealing ideology.  The PKK’s Marxist tenets in 
particular were highly attractive to many Kurds for whom the enemy was not only Turkish 
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nationalism, but also the broader Western system that they perceived as economically and 
politically exploitative.385  The PKK increased their organization’s appeal further through the use 
of strategic framing, which Adamson defines as a method of interpreting events that creates 
meaning, organizes people, and supports a particular narrative.386  The PKK linked the 
marginalization and discrimination faced by Kurds in Western Europe with that faced by Kurds 
in Turkey.  Rather than insisting that Kurds acclimate to and integrate with surrounding 
populations, the PKK associated Kurdish identity with resistance.387  The ability to draw 
similarities between the experiences of Turkey’s Kurds and the Kurdish diaspora, in addition to 
drawing on connections with events in Turkey, enabled the PKK to create a significant 
constituency amongst the Western European Kurdish Diaspora. 
 The PKK was not the only Kurdish organization active in Western Europe in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Much of the violence linked with the PKK in Europe is connected with ‘turf wars’, 
conflict with other similar groups.388  Ultimately, however the PKK did become the dominant 
organization in Europe.  The precise causal mechanisms are unclear: certainly mobilization, the 
distribution of information, and strategic framing were key, in addition to the credibility the PKK 
was gaining through military activity in Turkey. By the mid-1980s, it had distinguished itself by 
proving that it was a group willing to resist by whatever means necessary and able to do so 
successfully.389  Though not as visible in Europe, that reputation traveled, impacting the 
perceptions of Europe’s Kurdish diaspora. Cultivating a group identity was less difficult than it 
might have otherwise been since the PKK was dealing with a population that felt increasingly 
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marginalized.  Through an extensive social and communications network, the PKK was able to 
strategically frame common grievances and recruit supporters.   
 It is important to note again that this by no means refers to the entire European Kurdish 
diaspora, but rather to the segment that identifies with and supports the PKK.  Though they are a 
significant minority, they are still small in number compared to the vast number of Kurds in 
Europe who have either neutral or strongly negative perceptions of the PKK. 
The PKK’s strategy in Europe was initially twofold, incorporating both political violence 
and political activity.390   Ultimately, the PKK used both institutional and confrontational 
political participation to mobilize resources, recruit fighters, and lobby within the European 
political system.  
 
Institutional Participation 
Europe’s democratic governance structures gave the PKK access that it rarely had in 
Turkey.  More than using the open system to run its own candidates, the PKK took advantage of 
access to politicians and free speech laws to lobby individuals, disseminate information, and 
build public awareness about the situation in Turkey.391  Perhaps most importantly, as the PKK 
and its influence continued to grow, Europe provided opportunities for the PKK to have the 
direct voice, as well as a chorus of sympathetic advocates, that was so difficult in Turkey.    
One important source of support was the alliances that the PKK was able to foster with 
other non-governmental groups, based on shared interests.392  Perhaps the best example of this is 
the involvement of Kurdish groups and human rights groups. It is unclear how many of these 
groups have PKK ties and what the extent of these ties are; however, given the scope of PKK 	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activity and involvement in Europe, it seems sensible to consider that at least one of the groups 
involved has such connections.  The concerns voiced by the PKK in this area are also not 
unfounded: given the extent of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Turkish government in 
the Southeast, it makes a great deal of sense to tie the two issues together.  Over time, human 
rights have become one of the most critical and best-publicized issues in the Kurdish Conflict.  
Much of the most informative publications are from organizations like the International Crisis 
Group, Amnesty International, and the Minorities at Risk Group.  In addition, there are a number 
of distinctly Kurdish human rights organizations, the largest of which is the Kurdish Human 
Rights Project in England.393   
 This was particularly helpful when dealing with the European Union as a whole.  While 
Turkey is not a part of the European Union, it has long been working with the EU in hopes of 
eventually becoming a member.  Human rights are not an uncommon stumbling block for 
Turkey in its quest for membership; however, when the EU assessed Turkey’s eligibility for 
membership in the 1990s, it became one of the key issues under discussion. 394  The PKK and 
other Kurdish groups worked extensively with human rights organizations, publicizing Turkey’s 
human rights violations in the Southeast to the European public in order to increase awareness. 
When Turkey’s EU Accession talks commenced in 2005, human rights remained a key agenda 
item.395  Though multiple human rights groups were involved in ensuring this area received EU 
attention, the Kurds were one of the key constituencies, working to lobby committee members, 
raise public awareness and lobby legislators.396  Turkey’s EU aspirations provided the PKK and 
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other advocates for Kurdish rights with yet another point of leverage to use against both the 
diaspora’s host countries and against Turkey.  
Most Kurdish cultural organizations in Europe claim complete autonomy; however, many 
have close ties with the PKK, even if the exact nature and extent of those ties is unclear.397  That 
is not to say all Kurdish organizations have links to the PKK; many organizations are in fact 
independent and even have difficult relationships with the PKK.398  However, the PKK has been 
able to use many such groups to organize the Kurdish diaspora in order to connect with European 
politicians and non-governmental organizations.  They were thus able to promote the Kurdish 
cause through a variety of means in institutional settings. 
 
Confrontational Participation 
Perhaps the most visible instances of PKK political activism in Europe are 
confrontational participation, specifically public protests. The PKK has historically been able to 
rally hundreds if not thousands of supporters in many of Western Europe’s major cities.  Perhaps 
the most visible example of this occurred in 1999: following Ocalan’s arrest, protestors took to 
the streets in major cities from London to Athens.  Though the geographic sprawl was 
remarkable, such protests were not a new phenomenon: protests in support of the PKK drew 
thousands of participants in Western Europe as early as 1990.399  Even the size of the 1999 
protests was not unprecedented: following Germany’s ban on the PKK in 1993, 500,000 
supporters demonstrated in Bonn.400  Protests often occur on major dates or holidays, such as 
Newroz or the anniversary of the PKK’s founding. 
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Another common means of confrontational participation that often accompanies protests 
is hunger strikes.  The vast majority of those who participate in pro-PKK hunger strikes do not 
die; however, the risk of physical harm or death is a persuasive means of demonstrating the 
importance of the Kurdish cause.401  Hunger strikes have been used in Turkish prisons as well; 
however, their most public and widespread civilian use was certainly in Europe. 402  For example, 
in the early 1990s, 700 individuals launched a hunger strike in Brussels to protest the Turkish 
government’s policies of forced migration.403  Such hunger strikes are another nonviolent yet 
very public way of participating in confrontational political action.  
The production and publication of various materials either by the PKK or by other 
Kurdish organizations is another key way of participating in confrontational political action.  
Such publications provide an alternative narrative regarding the conflict and, when smuggled 
into Turkey, break the government monopoly on information.  Many of these publications were 
journals, books or newspapers.  The use of radio and, later, the rise of the internet have also been 
effective ways for the PKK and other Kurdish nationalists to spread information.  Perhaps the 
most visible example of the PKK’s use of media, however, is regarding television. 
 There is a great deal of disagreement regarding the relationships MED-TV, Medya-TV 
and ROJ-TV have had with the PKK.  While the channels state their independence, the Turkish 
government maintains that the three stations have all been PKK mouthpieces, though it has had 
difficulty providing sufficient evidence for European legal bodies.404  The government has 
nevertheless been successful in pressuring European governments many times, as MED-TV and 
its successors have been shut down several times by their host countries for various other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Michael Biggs, “Dying Without Killing: Self-Immolations, 1963-2002,” in Making Sense of Suicide 
Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 30. 
402 Biggs, “Dying Without Killing,” 25. 
403 Lyon and Ucarer, “Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict,” 936. 
404 Romano, “Communications Technology in the Hands of Ethnic Nationalists,” 143. 
 	   99 
charges.405  In either case, satellite television was an effective way for the PKK to subvert the 
authority of the Turkish government.  Not only was broadcasting in Kurmanji or Zaza illegal 
until 2009, but these channels provided the Kurdish population in Turkey and in Europe 
unprecedented access to information about the conflict.  Whether or not it controlled the stations, 
the PKK is able to air its views and opinions through these channels, as PKK leaders regularly 
appear on or send messages to the stations.406  Views in opposition to the PKK also air with 
apparent freedom on these channels.407 
Public protest and the use of media have been the two main vehicles through which the 
PKK has participated in confrontational political activity in Europe.  This not only impacted 
European governments, but also spread to Turkey and the Middle East through the use of 
communications technology.  As is the case in Turkey, it is difficult to ascertain the depth and 
nature of PKK involvement in this activity; however, it is clearly a dominant player.  Clearly, 






The PKK has actively fostered the creation of a Kurdish identity among the European 
diaspora, using this shared identity and intelligent use of media to build a necessary support base.  
There currently exists a large network of nominally independent Kurdish organizations across 
Western Europe; while the exact nature of the relationships they have with the PKK is unclear, 
many do have such ties.   The PKK has used this network and the popular support gained 
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through its military activity in Turkey to become involved with European politics, in hopes of 





The PKK has used both institutional and confrontational political activism, engaging in 
civil society and traditional politics to further their goals.  This is particularly true in Europe 
where, as Chapter Four will discuss, violence proved largely ineffective. The PKK’s intentional 
efforts to develop a sense of Kurdish identity and draw in migrants demonstrates their 
understanding of the importance of civil society and that the involvement of civilians was far 
from accidental in most cases.   
This chapter also provided some insight into other available options and the often-
complicated nature of their relationships with the PKK.   It is important to consider how all 
Kurdish groups have faced the challenge posed by Turkey’s often authoritarian restrictions on 
speech related to the Kurdish Question and by the PKK`s frequent designation as an illegal 
organization.  Here, too, Europe and its more open and democratic society play a key role, as the 
majority of spokespersons both for the PKK and for other Kurdish groups are located in Europe 
beyond the reach of the Turkish authorities.   
This chapter demonstrates the PKK’s ability to adapt their tactics regarding more 
traditionally political actions in order to ensure their continued legitimacy in changing contexts.  
The next chapter will consider the PKK’s tactics in the realm of its best known action: violence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: TACTICS OF VIOLENCE 
 
 
 The previous chapters discussed the ways in which PKK strategy both impacts and is 
impacted by ideological change, and how the PKK operates in more traditional political spheres.  
However, the PKK is not usually known for its conventional political activity: to many, it is 
purely a terrorist408 organization.  As discussed in previous chapters, the PKK have often felt that 
violence was the only way to advance the cause of Kurdish nationalism.  However, it was also 
aware that its employment of violence has a dramatic effect on its public image, particularly in 
areas subject to that violence.  Consequently, the PKK does not simply perpetrate random acts of 
violence: rather, the PKK’s violence has often been another form of political activity.  Thus, it is 
important to analyze those tactical changes regarding the ways in which the PKK plans and 
executes attacks, particularly those that have popularly been labeled as terrorist attacks.  
The PKK uses political violence to further its military and political objectives. Though 
aspects of the party’s objectives vary across different geographic and temporal contexts, these 
tactics incorporate the aim of legitimizing violence.  Specific tactics can involve variation in the 
choice of target, the scale of the attack, the location and, if necessary, limiting the use of violent 
attacks altogether.  This chapter will examine tactical adjustments, particularly strategic framing, 
the use and reduction of violence, the causes of these changes, and their implications.   
Furthermore, it will divide this analysis according to geography.  Due to changes in its goals and 
audience, the PKK employs visibly different tactics in different locations.  Specifically, this 
chapter focuses on three regions: Southeastern Turkey, Western Turkey, and Western Europe.409  	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Each geographic subsection will to examine first the PKK’s perception of the importance of the 
audience and need for violence over time; how it actively sought to legitimate necessary violence 
for each audience; and the tactics it uses to do so.   
 
Data 
The data used in this chapter comes from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses for Terrorism 
(START).  This data set includes 1,535 attacks between 1984 and 2012 from the GTD database. 
For data collection, the GTD defined terrorism as “The intentional threat or actual use of 
violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion or intimidation.”  The dataset, therefore, does not include a great deal of the violence 
that took place in southeastern Turkey, as those instances may not fit this definition or 
insufficient information may be available.  To supplement, and fill explicit gaps in, the GTD 
data, this analysis also includes 161 attacks pulled from various media sources; these attacks are 
omitted unless explicitly stated.410  The dependent variable in this analysis will be casualties,411 
and the primary independent variables will be target type, whether the target is symbolic, and the 
location of the target.412  The unit of analysis is a single attack.  
This thesis drew conclusions from the GTD data with caution.  Specific information 
regarding the Kurdish conflict is difficult to attain, particularly quantitative data.  Journalists 
were regularly prevented from entering areas where the conflict was ongoing.  As mentioned 
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above, accounts published in the Turkish media were all subject to government scrutiny.  There 
also are multiple issues regarding attribution of individual attacks.  Unfortunately, incomplete 
and potentially unreliable data is an obstacle in using quantitative analysis to look at terrorists 
and their actions.  It also limits the depth of analysis possible using this data; nuanced 
conclusions are difficult when working with a dataset that possesses so many holes.413  While 
shortcomings in the dataset should certainly be kept in mind, the GTD data presents the best 
opportunity available for a quantitative understanding of the conflict. 
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Overall Trends 
Casualties due to PKK attacks span a large range, from zero to 167 dead or injured in a 
single attack.  However the graph is heavily skewed; approximately one-third of attacks have no 
casualties, and 87 percent of attacks have fewer than ten casualties.414  The single largest 
category of attacks is attacks against the military in southeastern Turkey, which includes 664 
attacks or 38 percent of attacks in the dataset.415  The largest concentration of symbolic targets is 
located in Europe, where the fewest overall attacks take place; this indicates a high emphasis on 
political, rather than military, objectives.416  Finally, a graph of attacks over time reveals visible 
patterns regarding their frequency: for example, there are a significantly higher number of 
attacks concentrated in the early 1990s.417  This chapter will explore many of these features in 
more depth later on.   
Certain trends support tactical shifts across the board.  Some of these are best visible in 
rhetoric; for example, the decision to first train suicide bombers in 1996 and Ocalan’s subsequent 
repudiation of the tactic.  Others appear only upon quantitative analysis.  The most significant 
shifts occur in the frequency, target type and location of terrorist activity.   
 The number of terrorist attacks overall goes down over the period.  For example, 1,249 
attacks, 75 percent of attacks in the dataset, occur in or before 1999.418  From 1994 until 1999, 
this meant an average of seventy-seven attacks each year.419  Between 2000 and 2011, prior to 
the spike in 2012, there were only an average of twenty attacks annually; even including that 
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spike, the annual average .is still significantly lower than pre-2000 numbers.420  The number of 
attacks on civilians also goes down: prior to 1999, 37 percent of attacks targeted civilians, while 
after 1999 that percentage was only 20 percent.421  In contrast, the number of attacks on military 
targets increased to 46 percent from 38 percent after 1999.422  There is therefore a significant 
shift in the targets of PKK attacks.  PKK-perpetrated violence that occurred outside of the 
definition of terrorism is overwhelmingly focused in the southeast and the military; therefore, the 
exclusion of those attacks does not pose a significant problem for these statistics.  These overall 
trends are only one piece of the picture; when broken down on a regional level, these statistics 




Southeast Turkey is the epicenter of the PKK’s fight, with the highest concentration of its 
supporters and also the most violence. Due to the high frequency of violence in this region, the 
PKK has focused primarily on constructing and supporting a narrative legitimizing its use of 
violence and on moving away from targeting civilians.  
 
Importance 
Southeastern Turkey is historically home to the majority of Turkey’s Kurds and, 
throughout the PKK’s existence, has been the location in which the bulk of PKK guerilla and 
terrorist violence occurs.423   Consequently, it is an essential area for the PKK to have supporters 
for recruitment, supplies and public support. The party’s primary tactics for doing so have been 
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the construction and support of a narrative that legitimizes the use of violence, and an intentional 
shift away from targeting civilians. 
From the beginning, the PKK wanted to take this fight to the people and the countryside.  
Since the suppression of a large-scale revolt in the 1950s, pro-Kurdish activism had been the 
domain of elites, focused primarily in urban areas.  However, these activists had lost a great deal 
of credibility in the intervening years; despite their agitation and the high political price they 
often paid, they seemed incapable of making progress or effecting change.424  The PKK was the 
first Kurdish group in quite some time to take its ideas back to the rural southeast and try to rally 
public support from the general population.   
The PKK’s Maoist influences are extremely visible here; in On Guerilla Warfare Mao is 
adamant about the importance of the people and guerillas’ dependence upon them.  For this 
reason, the first fundamental step that Mao outlines for prospective guerillas is “arousing and 
organizing the people.”425  The PKK’s noted adherence to Mao in other areas supports the idea 
that organizing and maintaining public support would have been a high priority for them.   
In addition to ideological motivations, public support satisfies two logistical necessities: 
recruits and supplies.  Mao is clear on this topic, stating, “The fountainhead of guerilla 
operations is in the masses of the people.”426  From the start, the PKK planned to draw much of 
their manpower form the southeast.  The need for recruits was exacerbated by the rate at which 
the PKK lost troops.  Scholars often cite the statistic that over 40,000 people have died since the 
start of the PKK’s fight.427  This figure, while as close to the truth as possible, omits a key piece 
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of information: PKK fighters make up at least half of those casualties.428  This is likely due to 
military technology, which gives the state advantages such as airplanes and helicopters that the 
PKK simply does not have access to.429  In detailed reports of PKK clashes with the Turkish 
military, the PKK consistently loses more fighters than they kill. This made attracting new 
recruits a constant priority from the beginning of the PKK’s fight.    
In addition, like any group, the PKK needed supplies.  With highly mobile units 
separated over a wide geographical area and, initially, avoiding large urban areas, the logical 
source of these supplies was local residents.  Without large established bases, fighters needed 
small amounts of supplies on a relatively regular basis, requiring consistent and widespread 
cooperation.  Again, Mao provides advice to the prospective revolutionary, directing that 
guerillas “must depend for the substance upon what the locality can afford.”430  Without food, 
clothing and weapons, the PKK would never have been able to carry out its fight.  
 The PKK were largely successful in gaining sufficient public support to keep recruits 
coming in and keep supplying their soldiers.  This however, raises a conundrum: many scholars 
have observed that though casualties negatively impacted public opinion in Western Turkey, the 
PKK found that violence had a much smaller impact on public opinion and support in the 
Southeast.431  Public sympathy and the acceptance of violence are particularly striking in this 
region, where the majority of civilian casualties have been inflicted.432  This dataset only 
particularly reveals the extent of this concentration, as it does not include the guerilla warfare 
which occurred entirely in the southeast.  That there is any public sympathy for the PKK is 
therefore surprising; its extent is still more shocking.   	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Management and Framing 
The PKK actively worked to create and maintain this public support from the very 
beginning.  This included perpetuating the idea that the PKK fought for a just cause and that, in 
pursuit of this cause, civilian casualties were a regrettable but necessary consequence. 433   Some 
scholars have also suggested that this legitimacy is easier to perceive in a society where violence 
is historically prevalent in honor killings and other elements of tribal politics.434  This context, so 
different from that in Europe or western Turkey, arguably makes legitimizing violence against 
civilians much easier for the PKK.  
From the beginning, the PKK’s best tactic for legitimizing its use of violence was the 
narrative in which the PKK only killed those who collaborate with or receive material support 
from the state; in this narrative, civilians killed in PKK attacks were not innocent victims, but 
traitors.435  This narrative serves to both intimidate those who would collaborate with the state, 
and legitimizes the PKK’s use of violence.  To support this framing, the PKK has, on multiple 
occasions, staged large-scale attacks on the homes of members of the koy korucu or Village 
Guards, Kurdish militias employed by the Turkish state.436   It has also explicitly cited some of 
the most severe attacks against civilians as operations against traitors. After a particularly 
horrifying attack in which thirty civilians were killed, including sixteen children, PKK fighters 
told a nearby town that such violence was the consequence of working with the Turkish state.  
“If you don’t want us to repeat the Pinarcik massacre,” they allegedly warned, “don’t betray.”437  
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If violence against civilians was not, in fact, indiscriminate, but rather targeted the PKK’s 
enemies, Kurds who turned against their own people, it became more acceptable.  The PKK 
actively encouraged the belief that this was the case, both by targeting its raids against such 
individuals to some extent and through its rhetoric. 
 The PKK also supported this rhetoric with action. In clear contrast to the violence in 
Pinarcik, a warning for those who collaborated with the government, when the PKK raided 
villages that had not accepted state aid events unfolded very differently.  For example, one week 
after Pinarcik, the inhabitants of three Mardin province villages found themselves gathered into 
the town squares, at the mercy of PKK fighters.438  Because these villages were not allied with 
the state, there was little or no violence; instead, villagers were subjected to speeches and 
pamphlets regarding the PKK’s aims and the legitimacy of its fight.439  There were no PKK-
inflicted casualties in these villages.440  The PKK clearly established a contrast in the treatment 
meted out to those who did and did not “collaborate”, reinforcing its rhetoric of targeting traitors 
by demonstrating the outcome for those who remained loyal.   
 The PKK’s public support is also based, not only on the PKK’s actions, but on what the 
alternatives are, both specifically within the Kurdish population and in Turkey more broadly.  
The Turkish government has, for a long time, systematically shut down any Kurdish presence in 
legitimate politics, increasing the sense among many Kurds that nothing short of violence would 
be effective.441  In Aliza Marcus’ interviews with former PKK members, there is the repeated 
sentiment that violence was the only option.  In one fighter’s words, “To get rid of [Turkish rule] 
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you couldn’t use democracy.  We though the only way to win was through struggle.”442  To all 
appearances, this was a widely held sentiment among the Kurdish population, not only in 
Turkey, but in the surrounding countries as well.   
 In addition to a lack of other, less violent Kurdish groups, the PKK was also contrasted 
with Turkish military and Special Forces active in the region.  These fighters were, to all 
appearances, just as bad as, if not worse than, the PKK.  The military’s adoption of a “scorched 
earth” policy led to the widespread expulsion of villagers from their homes.  The difficulty in 
identifying insurgents among the local population led to numerous instances of the army taking 
its revenge against the civilian population.443   In addition, there were widespread arrests of 
anyone suspected of assisting the PKK, with no legal process or transparency. These often-
arbitrary detainments were accompanied by appalling prison conditions and incredible human 
rights violations.444  The heavy hand of the military caused many individuals to become 
increasingly willing to overlook or accept the violent consequences of the PKK’s fight.445  Such 
abuses also lessened the extent to which the PKK had to work to legitimize its use of violence 
against the Turkish government or military. 
Aside from physical abuses, there were other ways in which the government alienated the 
Kurdish population.  Throughout the conflict, the government has, to varying degrees, controlled 
the media, printing stories in the newspaper that are discriminatory, misleading or even entirely 
fabricated.446  Consequently, when newspapers print reports of PKK casualties, many Kurds are 
inclined to believe that the paper is either inflating the numbers or blaming the PKK for crimes 	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committed by the military.447  As one Kurdish citizen remarked, “The state lied so often, when 
they said something true I didn’t believe them.”448  The government’s attempts to smear the 
PKK’s reputation backfired, in that many Kurds began to disbelieve official reports of PKK 
violence, even when they were true. 
While the actions of the Turkish government and military certainly assisted in making the 
PKK’s actions more publicly acceptable, the next section will discuss ways in which the PKK 
also actively sought to manage this perception and legitimize its use violence against civilians, 
through the narrative about who it was killing and by persistently appealing to public opinion.   
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Tactics 
Despite its overall success, the narrative of killing only traitors gradually ceased to 
resonate with populations in the southeast in the same way.  The PKK adapted to this by 
decreasing the relative scale of attacks on civilians and shifting its focus on military targets.449  
There is a noticeable decline in the kinds of large-scale attacks on whole villages over time and a 
decrease in the percentage of attacks targeting civilians.450  The amount of violence overall also 
decreases; the number of attacks after 1999 is a fraction of the number of attacks in the years 
before.451  It was significant when, in 2012, observers commented the violence might be reaching 
mid-1990s levels again.452   Even during this period, however, a significantly lower number of 
attacks were aimed at civilians, rather than at the military.453 
Some commentators suggest that the PKK’s public support is due entirely to intimidation 
and extortion, rather than genuine public sentiment.454  While it is certainly true that such 
intimidation and extortion did occur, at times on a large scale, there are two issues with this 
assertion.  The first is that the PKK has visibly backpedaled away from tactics that provoked 
public disapproval; for example, its brief attempt to implement forcible conscription in 1996.455  
The second is the scale of the PKK’s support, even outside the areas in which the group is active. 
While such threats were undoubtedly a factor, they explain the provision of supplies or some 
willingness to overlook offense.  However, the amount and intensity of public support the 
organization has is impossible to secure with threats alone.  The number of people who support 
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the PKK’s goals, sometimes while disapproving of its tactics, exceeds what seems plausible to 
maintain through violent means. 
Conclusion 
The PKK has successfully maintained, if not increased, levels of public support in the 
Southeast throughout the conflict.  Though some scholars speak to explain this by citing the 
levels of violence intrinsic to Kurdish society, this is insufficient; the actions of the PKK far 
exceed violence that might be considered socially acceptable.456  Instead, this support is largely 
due to the PKK’s careful management and framing of its violence in order to secure its 
legitimacy. 
One area in which the success of these tactics is particularly visible is that of recruitment: 
one of the reasons the conflict has continued for so long is the PKK’s ability to replace 
astronomical losses.  More than half of total casualties in the conflict since 1984 have been PKK 
fighters.457  In 1992, for example, the PKK suffered huge losses; however, it took in more 
fighters than they lost, meaning that the overall number of active fighters was actually highest at 
the end of the year.458  In 2009, the chief of the Turkish General Staff observed that the PKK 
“pipeline of recruits…has continued almost unabated” despite multiple efforts to stem the flow, 
and that this was one of the chief reasons that, after twenty-five years, the Turkish military was 
little closer to solving the so-called “Kurdish Problem.”459  
The PKK’s public support in the southeast is also apparent through public protest and 
frequently quoted public sentiment.  The PKK is the dominant Kurdish political group in 
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Turkey.460  Even if many Kurds do not agree with the group’s tactics, they often recognize its 
achievements and support its cause, and the group has remained a formidable institution with a 
considerable amount of support both in Turkey and its surrounding countries.461  It is difficult to 
ascertain the precise implications of PKK tactical shifts; however, its ability to maintain public 
support throughout a conflict that has had an immense toll of the region is indicative of its ability 
to use tactical shifts, and provide a compelling legitimization for its violence. 
 
West Turkey 
As Turkey’s political and economic hub, Western Turkey has a large number of soft 
targets with high symbolic value and the presence of a high concentration of both domestic and 
international media.  These factors make it a key location for political violence.  However, 
Western Turkey is also home to a less sympathetic audience consisting predominantly of ethnic 
Turks.  While the PKK has uses political violence in Western Turkey, it has implemented tactics 
to intentionally limit casualties and carefully manage public attribution in order to minimize the 
negative ramifications on public opinion. 
 
Importance 
Western Turkey was always an attractive location to terrorist organizations within the 
country, and the PKK is no exception.  Unlike the southeast which has been under martial rule 
throughout much of its history and contains a prodigious military presence, western Turkey, and 
particularly its big cities, have a low military presence and, usually, much more social freedom.  
Turkey’s political and economic power is disproportionately concentrated in its western regions, 	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with Istanbul alone holding approximately 20 percent of Turkey’s population and contributes 27 
percent of its GDP.462  It is a center of production and economic growth, and contains both the 
largest city, Istanbul, and the capital, Ankara, where many political decisions are made. Western 
Turkey is also home to an active tourism industry, which means a larger presence of foreigners, 
foreign capital, and foreign attention.   
Western Istanbul’s financial, political and economic significance create a large number of 
high-value soft targets.  Combined with the high presence of foreigners and diplomatic centers, 
events in the west are much more extensively reported in the international press.  This is 
particularly true given the relative frequency of violence; the situation in the southeast has at 
times been so bad that individual attacks are rarely reported.   These factors combine to create a 
setting in which the PKK has a much wider audience in the west of Turkey, particularly in the 
cities, than it did in the southeast, and therefore a greater opportunity to communicating both its 
cause and its capability on an international stage..  
These opportunities were initially limited for a significant period of time, as the PKK 
chose to concentrate its resources in the Southeast.  Western Turkey, much more urbanized and 
hardly mountainous, is no place to launch a guerilla war.  In addition, the Kurdish population in 
this region was historically small; now, migration has shifted the balance so that half of Turkey’s 
Kurds now live in the western region.463  Some of these migrants were victims of the army’s 
relocation policies, while others moved to escape the violence and economic inequality.  Almost 
all of those who left moved to urban areas, and many of them moved west.464  Numbers are 
difficult to attain, due to Turkish census laws and the unofficial nature of many of these 	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migrants’ lifestyles. Regardless of the exact numbers, however, there has clearly been a major 
shift, particularly in the last twenty-five years, leading many to point to the existence of a 
diaspora within Turkey.465  Like many diaspora groups, Kurds in western Turkey suffer from 
high unemployment rates, economic inequality and frequent social marginalization.466  Like most 
diasporas, it is also more vulnerable to political radicalization.467  
 
Management and Framing 
Even once opportunities to operate in Western Turkey became available, attached to this 
greater opportunity was also a greater risk.  To the vast majority of ethnic Turks, the PKK’s fight 
is entirely illegitimate.  If in the southeast it stood some chance of being characterized as 
freedom fighters, in the west the organization is firmly classified as a terrorist entity.  Here, even 
more than in the southeast, high civilian casualty rates quickly become detrimental to the public 
perception of a group’s legitimacy.468  In addition, in the West, there is no guerilla fighting, few 
military targets and few instances in which potential victims can fight back; in addition, due to 
conscription and mandatory service in the national military, even the deaths of soldiers in the 
southeast are more likely to be seen as the deaths of innocents; therefore, even those attacks can 
negatively impact the party’s reputation.  Therefore, though the west is full of more easily 
accessible and highly public targets, it also presents a set of challenges that are largely absent in 
the Southeast.  The negative predisposition in public opinion is only too obvious: for example, 
until recently, the Turkish press regularly referred to Ocalan as bebek katili or baby-killer.   
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Despite these significant challenges to providing a legitimate frame for violence in 
Western Turkey, the PKK managed public perception in a number of ways.  One of these 
involves issues of attribution.  On numerous occasions, the PKK has taken responsibility for its 
actions by calling the media or making public statements to that effect.  However, perhaps even 
more telling, are the cases where it explicitly denies culpability, as it did for a large-scale attack 
in 2008.   
On July 27, 2008, two bombs in an Istanbul shopping district killed 17 and injured 
approximately 154 people.469  No organization officially claimed responsibility, and newspaper 
accounts make it clear that the identity and affiliation of the perpetrator were unknown.  The 
attack is an anomaly in the dataset, the only attack on civilians in Western Turkey associated 
with the PKK with this number of casualties by a wide margin.470   
Holding someone responsible for the attack quickly proved problematic. Turkish police 
blamed the PKK, and arrested several individuals, issuing a statement saying that these men were 
PKK members and they were responsible for the bombings.  They offered no evidence to support 
these claims.471   
To counter the police’s claims, an official PKK spokesperson appeared on television to 
deny PKK involvement and express his deepest sympathies for victims of the attack.472  Clearly, 
even if the PKK did perpetrate the attack, it recognized that certain lines had been crossed. The 
response of the PKK leadership demonstrate its awareness that attacks on this scale do them 
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more harm than good, turning public opinion against them and reinforcing its identity as a 
terrorist organization rather than a political player.   
There are multiple potential explanations for the attack and its perpetrators.  Due to the 
decentralized nature of illegal organizations like the PKK, there are two questions to answer: the 
first being whether the attackers believed that the attack was in the name of the PKK; and the 
second being whether the PKK leadership knew about the attack.  It is entirely possible that the 
attack was intentionally perpetrated by the PKK, and the spokesman was simply lying.  If the 
PKK was responsible, with the full knowledge of the leadership, there is also the question of 
intended scale: the number of casualties could have been an accidental; explosives and amateurs 
should not mix for a reason.  It is also possible that the police were lying and that the PKK was 
not involved; there were several other terrorist organizations active in Istanbul at the time, 
including various al-Qaeda affiliates.473   Of course, it is also possible that the PKK intentionally 
planned an attack that it hoped would injure upwards of one hundred people and affect many 
hundreds more.   However, regardless of the origin of the attack, the party’s response reveals its 
political awareness and its ability to adapt to maintain public opinion. 
The group responsible for the July 27 attack remains unknown.  However, the attack and 
its aftermath reveal the PKK’s awareness of the implications of large casualties, therefore 
supporting the idea that other attacks included intentional efforts to minimize those casualties.  In 
other words, the July 27 attack supports the idea that the goal of PKK bombings in the west is 
not maximum death and destruction, but rather is an act of political speech, meant to publicize 
the PKK’s cause and demonstrate its capabilities.    
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PKK attacks in western Turkey are very different from those in the southeast in a number 
of ways.  Both the amount and intensity of attacks is significantly lower in the west, providing 
support for the argument that the PKK is intentionally limiting casualties.474   
  Perhaps the most obvious change in PKK tactics is that the predominant form of 
violence in western Turkey is what is often referred to as terrorism: attacks by a few individuals 
against soft, civilian targets, often using some kind of explosive.475 There are also discernable 
patterns in the PKK’s tactics that point to deliberate decisions focused on maintaining as much 
public support as possible while grabbing media attention and delivering credible threats to the 
Turkish state, most discernably in their choice of targets and the number and timing of attacks.    
Western Turkey has the lowest concentration of civilian targets of any of the three 
regions; however, attacks on civilians are the majority of attacks within western Turkey.476  On 
average, these attacks had 5.53 casualties, fewer than occurred in the southeast.477  In addition, 
Western Turkey had the second highest concentration of symbolic targets after Europe.478  These 
statistics support the assertion that violence in the West of Turkey is more calculated and 
political, particularly when it comes to minimizing casualties. 
This relatively low number of casualties becomes even more interesting in context.  
Istanbul is among the densest cities in the world, with an average population density of 2,666 
inhabitants per square kilometer.479  In Beyoglu, a central municipality on the European side that 
includes main areas such as Taksim Square, it is as high as 27,368 inhabitants per square 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Figure 8: Casualties and Attacks by Type and Location. 
475 Figure 9: Attacks by Target Type and Location. 
476 Figure 9: Attacks by Target Type and Location. 
477 Figure 8: Attacks and Casualties by Target Type and Location. When this number is limited to 
confirmed PKK attacks, the mean drops goes down to 2.28 casualties per attack. 
478 Figure 9: Attacks by Target Type and Location. 
479 “News Release: The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2012,” Turkish 
Statistical Institutes, published 28 January 2013, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/.  Numbers from 2012. 
 	   120 
kilometer.480  Including foot traffic and temporary residents, areas like Beyoglu can have as 
many as 700,000 people per square kilometer at any given time.481  This means that even attacks 
with a small physical footprint can quickly affect a large number of people, and provides a more 
informative context for the low casualty numbers in PKK attacks. 
In contrast with the southeast, PKK attacks in the west are more frequently aimed at 
civilian targets, rather than military.482  In addition, more attacks in the west are on what are 
referred to as “symbolic targets.”483  The number of casualties in attacks on symbolic targets that 
the PKK claims is lower on average than in attacks on other types of target.484  This makes sense: 
symbolic attacks explicitly lack strategic value and are often chosen to send a message.  
Inflicting a large civilian toll risks overshadowing the attack’s intended message with stories of 
gruesome civilian casualties.  It also risks negatively impacting audience perceptions without 
strategic payoff.  Finally, it is important to note the lower number of PKK-perpetrated suicide 
bombing attacks in western Turkey.485 
The ways in which these considerations affected tactical decision-making is best viewed 
in examples, including the April 1994 attack on the Grand Bazaar or Kapalicarsi, the 1999 
bombing of an Istanbul park, and the 2008 bombings in Istanbul.  These attacks are particularly 
informative in contrast with a series of al-Qaeda bombings in Istanbul in 2003.   
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On April 2, 1994, a bomb next to Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar killed 2 individuals and 
injured 8.486  The Grand Bazaar is an enclosed, and crowded space, where a larger attack could 
have been potentially devastating.  Security protocols are also not particularly stringent; there is, 
for example, no bag check at any of the multiple entrances.  Combined with the number of 
strangers coming and going in the vicinity and its status as a major tourist attraction, it is 
certainly a soft target, perhaps even softer than most.  The bomb was placed in one of the few 
open spaces inside the bazaar, with wide roads leading directly to the outside of the bazaar.487  
The location of the bomb may have been accidental; however, its placement in the center of the 
bazaar makes that less likely.  The PKK later claimed responsibility for the attack; it was the first 
time the organization had killed a foreign tourist.488  
On July 4, 1999, an unknown individual left a homemade shrapnel bomb in a garbage bin 
near a park in Istanbul.489  Upon detonation, the bomb killed one individual and injured 25 
others.490  Police suspected the PKK, but the organization’s leadership did not comment on the 
bomb.491  In either case, the bomb was hardly set in a high traffic area, nor was the decision to 
place the bomb in a park likely accidental; finding parks in Istanbul is a bit difficult, as only 1.5 
percent of the city’s land is dedicated public parks.492  These factors support the argument that 
this bombing was likely not planned with the intention of maximizing casualties.   
In both of these attacks, the PKK had a low number of casualties, particularly when 
considering the population density in the public, highly trafficked areas in or near the bombs.  	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While placed in very public locations, the attacks were organized so as to maximize visibility 
while limiting, if not minimizing, casualties. Thus, the attacks functioned more as a statement or 
threat than an effort to destroy, conforming to definitions of political violence used with the 
intent of coercion and supporting the hypothesis that the PKK deliberately used tactics intended 
to maximize the political impact of their attacks while minimizing the negative effects on its 
reputation.  
Analysis of these attacks is interesting in its own right; however, it is still more 
informative when compared with attacks by other groups.  On November 20, 2003, explosive-
laden trucks were detonated near HSBC headquarters and the British consulate in Beyoglu, 
Istanbul.  Al-Qaida soon claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed 26 people and injured 
over 400 individuals.493   Among those killed in the attack was the British Consul-General for 
Istanbul.494  This attack, proudly claimed by al-Qaeda, had an impact larger than any of the 
PKK’s attacks in western Turkey, acknowledged or otherwise.  Obviously, al-Qaeda is a trained 
and sophisticated organization with a proven desire and capability to inflict massive casualties.   
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the reason the PKK has not inflicted casualties on 
this scale is because it is incapable of doing so.  Based on Istanbul’s population density and the 
example of other possible large-scale attacks in the city, it seems more likely that the PKK has 
chosen to limit casualties in their attacks, particularly in attacks on symbolic targets.  
 
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) 
As mentioned previously, the number of groups actively using political violence in 
Western Turkey complicates issues of attribution.  For some of these groups, not only their 	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internal dynamics but their connection with and allegiance to the PKK are unclear.  This is most 
significant in the case of the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), founded in the early 2000s.  
TAK has perpetrated a number of attacks throughout the last decade, and is active only in 
western cities.  The group was created at a moment when the PKK was rife with internal 
divisions after Ocalan’s capture and subsequent statements.  It does not claim formal affiliation 
with the PKK, and the PKK has explicitly denied any connection with the group.495  Turkish 
authorities have repeated on numerous occasions that TAK is simply a rebranded group of the 
PKK; however, insufficient evidence exists regarding the affiliation or lack thereof between the 
two.496  Aside from the PKK, TAK is the most active Kurdish terrorist organization in western 
Turkey, making it necessary to discuss it here.497  
In comparison with the PKK, TAK perpetrates more violent attacks, often choosing times 
inconvenient for ongoing talks between the PKK and the Turkish government.  The average 
number of casualties in its attacks is 9.81, significantly higher than that of confirmed PKK 
attacks.498  TAK targets are strictly soft, with many attacks focusing on destinations frequented 
by tourists, including hotels and touristic attractions.499  It also often publicly claim its attacks 
rather than leaving ambiguity.  This is best illustrated with the example of the TAK’s first major 
attack in 2004. 
On August 9, 2004, explosives detonated in two Istanbul hotels.  The twin attacks, which 
occurred at two in the morning, killed two people and injured seven.500 Additionally, severe 
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structural damage was caused to one of the hotels.501  TAK called a German-based media outlet 
to claim responsibility for the attacks shortly after the blasts.502  At the time, TAK was an 
unknown group; this was its first public attack.  While an al-Qaida affiliate later claimed 
involvement in the attack as well, TAK remained the prime suspect for the attack.503 
These attacks fit with many of the aforementioned trends to which most TAK attacks 
adhere.  They were clearly calculated to attract media attention, particularly from foreign 
countries, and to hurt Turkey’s lucrative tourist industry.504  In addition, though significantly 
higher than the number of casualties in confirmed PKK attacks, the number of casualties in TAK 
attacks pales in comparison to the 2008 Al-Qaeda attack.  As with the PKK, it would be a 
mistake to assume that this is because the group lacks the capability; rather, there is a reason why 
the group is deciding to limit the scale of its attacks.  Unfortunately, there is very little 
information available on the TAK, leaving its intentions opaque.    
PKK explicit distancing from TAK could be due to a number of reasons, from setting up 
a good cop-bad cop situation with the Turkish government, providing contrast to its apparent 
reason and moderation, or simply as a rebranded but intentional offshoot of the group.  However, 
it is equally likely that TAK is a group of individuals angered by Ocalan’s conciliatory attitude 
following his capture who decided to break off from the PKK and continue to rely solely on 
violence.  In either case, the PKK’s decision to distance itself from TAK makes it necessary to 
also consider TAK attacks separately, rather than including them in the larger group of PKK 
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attacks.  Whether the separation is for public perception and political advantage or a genuine lack 
of connection, TAK attacks belong in their own category.    
 
Conclusion 
PKK attacks in western Turkey are more political than those in the southeast.  They are 
significantly fewer in number, disproportionately affect symbolic targets, rather than strategic 
targets, and have lower casualties overall.  An examination of the population statistics in Istanbul 
and comparison with attacks by other groups demonstrates that the number of casualties in PKK 
attacks is relatively low; a detailed examination of these attacks demonstrates the possibility that 
the PKK is intentionally minimizing casualties.  Additionally, in potential PKK attacks where 
there are a high number of casualties, the PKK often explicitly disclaims involvement and 
condemns the attack.  Due to what is necessary to maintain public support and due to the 
character of the location, the PKK’s activity in western Turkey is significantly different than that 




The PKK’s use of political violence in Europe was always less frequent than in Turkey; 
however, even this initial limitation proved insufficient to prevent a highly negative turn in 
public opinion.  Europe is consequently an instance of the PKK’s ability to recognize the 
inefficacy of violent tactics in certain contexts and adjust its goals and actions accordingly. 
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Importance 
The Kurdish diaspora in Europe was an important source of resources for the PKK.  The 
scale of financial contributions flowing to Turkey from Europe is unclear; however, various 
estimates have indicated that it was a significant amount of financial capital.505 Also unclear was 
the source of this money; experts debate the extent to which this money came from voluntary 
contributions as opposed to extortion and even the drug trade.506  The PKK and its various 
affiliated organizations also made money through the sale of publications, whether video 
cassettes or written materials.507   In addition, the PKK took recruits from the diaspora in 
Germany and the Netherlands to come fight in Turkey.  Ensuring this base of support has been 
crucial to the PKK. 
 As Chapter Three discussed, European political systems allowed the PKK greater access 
to formal politics.  The open democratic structures of many EU countries allowed PKK 
sympathizers and supporters to lobby politicians, particularly throughout Turkey’s many 
attempts to join the European Union, to put pressure on Turkey.  The PKK could also access 
media outlets, as well as creating their own, to get around the Turkish state’s monopoly on news. 
In addition, the PKK valued its relationships with European politicians.  Though the European 
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Management and Framing 
From the beginning, the PKK’s strategy in Europe was the second portion of a dual 
strategy, in which the PKK employed violence against the state within Turkey and pursued more 
political activities in Europe.508  Some authors see the violence as the logical evolution of a cause 
that gained little traction through purely political channels; others see it as the result of a desire 
for revenge.509  The sporadic attacks on Turkish businesses and, more frequently, Turkish 
government throughout the period could support either argument.510  It is important to note that 
even if these attacks were motivated by anger, casualties were rare.  The exception to this is of 
course the assassination of former PKK members and conflict with rival groups; however, while 
such internal violence is concerning and important, it is not the focus of this thesis.   
The PKK certainly pulled no punches in terms of the rhetoric aimed as Turkey’s 
European allies.  Perhaps the most famous example of this was in 1996 when Ocalan’s 
threatened Germany with the idea that “Every Kurd can become a suicide bomber.”511  
Fortunately this rhetoric was only that; there were no acknowledged PKK suicide bombings in 
Europe.512  However, it certainly colored the European view of the PKK and contributed to its 
negative reputation, one that seems disproportionate with the amount of PKK-perpetrated 
violence in the region. 
If PKK activity in western Turkey is visibly different, the nature of attacks in Europe is 
an even starker contrast to the southeast.  The average casualties and the number of violent 
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attacks attributed to the PKK are exponentially lower.513  In addition, the coordination in attacks 
is visibly higher, synced across multiple countries.  Despite the lower amount of political 
violence, the PKK’s European activity is an extremely illustrative instance of its ability to 
recognize the inefficacy of violent tactics and adjust its priorities and actions accordingly. 
 
Tactics 
 Overall, in Europe, the GTD data set includes 232 attacks.  The majority of these attacks 
occur between 1987 and 1995.514  The mean number of casualties in a given attack was 0.15, an 
indication that the majority of the attacks inflicted no casualties.515  Many of these attacks 
targeted civilians; in fact, despite having the fewest attacks overall, the second greatest 
concentration of attacks on civilians occurred in Europe.516  The vast majority of attacks in 
Europe struck symbolic targets; Europe also had the highest number of attacks on symbolic 
targets out of any region.517  There was only a single attack on a military target in Europe; it 
involved no casualties.518 
 A series of attacks in June 1993 are a good example of the type of attacks perpetrated by 
the PKK in Europe and the evident level of planning and coordination.  On June 24, Kurdish 
activists likely affiliated with the PKK attacked Turkish businesses and consulates in twelve 
cities throughout Western Europe.519  June 24 was hardly an isolated incident; similarly 
coordinated attacks with minimal casualties also occurred on other dates including on November 
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28, 1994; February 25, 1995; and on March 29, 1995.520  Such attacks caused very limited 
human casualties; however, they did inflict property damage and sent a strong message.    
The PKK soon realized, however, that such attacks prompted a strong and unwelcome 
backlash against the PKK.  Newspapers described the attacks on June 24 as a “terrorist rampage” 
and called for Europe to give Turkey stronger military support to strike back at the 
organization.521   There were direct consequences as well: in November 1993, Germany and 
France banned the PKK and thirty-five affiliated organizations.522  While the bans did little to 
prevent the groups from operating, it drastically limited its political options, preventing it from 
officially interacting with European politicians and from lobbying for Kurdish rights.523  It was 
quickly clear that such violence came at an immense cost to the PKK’s political legitimacy and 
activity. 
 The evident drawbacks to such violence eventually caused the PKK to reconsider its use 
of violence in Europe.  After 1995, levels of violence in Europe dropped significantly, evidence 
of a clear shift in policies.524   The PKK’s continuation of large-scale, albeit heavily altered, 
activity in Europe demonstrates that this was clearly the result of a tactical decision, rather than 
simple distraction.   
Ocalan ultimately moved to arguing, not for violence, but for non-violent political 
dialogue with Europe, expressing his desire “gain legitimacy as the spokesperson for all 
Kurds.”525  Conferences regarding the Kurdish Issue began to occur more frequently, particularly 
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with the creation of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE).526  This body, located in Europe and 
with a membership consisting of activists and intellectuals, as well as former members of 
Turkish parliament, is among those that advocated a political solution to the ongoing Kurdish 
oppression in Turkey and its neighboring countries.527  The KPE and other groups included 
representatives from multiple countries and organizations; at least nominally, neither the PKK 
nor Ocalan held a privileged role, though the party remained heavily involved.528  
Though there were multiple large-scale pro-PKK demonstrations throughout Europe in 
the late 1990s, particularly after Ocalan’s arrest, such demonstrations were usually without major 
incident or violence.529  One arguable exception to this lack of violence was the use of self-
immolation by a significant number of PKK supporters, particularly during 1999.  For an 
example of scale, over the course of the single day, seven Kurds self-immolated in Western 
Europe as part of protests following Ocalan’s arrest.530   The use of self-immolation in Europe is 
particularly interesting, as civilians in Turkey never adopted the tactic; it was only ever used in 
prisons.531  Michael Biggs, an academic who studies self-immolation as a form of political 
violence, argues that, unlike terrorist activity, self-immolation is not a weapon of war, but rather 
an act of protest.532  He further describes how self-immolation achieves the same shock value as 
an act of outwardly focused violence, but without the accompanying damage to public opinion, 
as self-immolation does not involve innocent victims.533  Consequently, rather than the coercive 
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intent of a terrorist attack, self-immolation is intended to provoke public attention and sympathy.  
PKK supporters’ use of self-immolation in Europe following the cessation in political violence is 
another interesting testament to the way in which the PKK adapted its tactics based on the public 
response to violence.  While the intense need for political expression remained the same, the 
means of that expression changed drastically after 1996. 
The PKK’s use of terrorism in Europe changed over time; it ultimately abandoned the 
tactic altogether.  Hunger strikes and public protest also became a more widespread means of 
directing popular attention in Europe to the plight of the Kurds.534  The use of self-immolation 
also makes an interesting statement about the changed objectives in European political activity.  
These alternative methods of political activity are more indicative of the type of PKK activism 
and advocacy most visible in Europe, particularly in the 21st century. 
 
Conclusion 
 The PKK was unable to legitimize its use of violence in Europe and, consequently, chose 
to strictly limit it instead.  For the PKK, Europe was always more of a place for political, rather 
than military, action; over time, it became an almost exclusively political arena.  The coordinated 
attacks with wide geographic reach and minimal casualties provide evidence for a highly 
coordinated organization that implemented its attacks extremely deliberately, thus supporting the 
assertion that this minimization of casualties was intentional.  Terrorism ultimately gave way to 
nonviolent protest and political action in Europe, as Chapter Three discussed. 
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Conclusion 
 Thought the PKK felt it had to use violence to reach its objectives, it was also aware of 
the negative impact violence could have on public opinion.  Therefore, the PKK’s use of 
violence was carefully planned in order to achieve various political goals.   One of these goals 
was minimizing damage to public opinion through the legitimization of the PKK’s use of 
violence.  This often also involved minimizing certain types of violence or violence overall.  To 
best understand this, one must consider the PKK’s use of violence as an inherently political 
activity.  Due to the different audiences and different goals present in various places, it made 
sense to divide this analysis by geographical location in order to better understand the tactics 
present in each.  Comparing the PKK’s attacks across time and geographic regions made it easier 
to understand the way tactics changed and adapted to fit various contexts.   
 This chapter contains a demonstration of another area in which the PKK have evolved 
their tactics for political action in order to ensure their continued legitimacy and cultivate public 
support.  Such a demonstration supports the overall thesis regarding the PKK’s ability to learn 
and adapt in changing contexts.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
The previous four chapters have demonstrated the ways in which the PKK is a rational 
organization that learns from its mistakes, changing its strategy and tactics to adapt to new 
circumstances.  It does so to maintain the party’s legitimacy and relevance in the discussions 
around Kurdish nationalism. Such discussions have become increasingly prominent within 
Turkey largely because of the PKK’s actions; while there have certainly been independent actors 
involved, the PKK has dominated politics regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey over the last 
three decades.  In conclusion, this chapter will lay out the empirical conclusions of the preceding 
chapters, before discussing their implications the near future. 
 
Empirical Conclusions 
Chapter One begins by asking whether it is even appropriate to analyze the decisions of a 
terrorist organization such as the PKK, particularly when society often perceives terrorism and 
political violence more broadly as inherently irrational.  Increasingly, however, scholars have 
demonstrated that, terrorists may actually be rational, political actors.  In order to be considered 
rational, organizations or individuals must meet the three criteria of the strategic model.  
Furthermore, an assessment of an organization’s ideology and history can determine whether it is 
acting as a political actor, or with different motivations.  The international community is often 
hesitant to consider terrorists as rational, as it challenges existing norms of behavior, as well as 
the current status quo and power hierarchy.  However, in order to understand terrorists, and 
therefore effectively address terrorism, one must examine their beliefs, priorities and decisions. 
 Most of the Western world classifies the PKK as a terrorist organization.  Even in 
academic work, its members are often portrayed as bloodthirsty, brutal killers, with little or no 
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attention paid to their motivations.  In fact, the PKK fulfills the criteria of the strategic model, 
and has demonstrated its identity as a political actor throughout its existence.  Kurdish history 
shows that, in Turkey, the PKK saw little alternative to violence: all other methods of political 
activity were crushed by the state and the military.  The brutality of the Turkish military in the 
region also increased the appeal of violence, as the penalties for nonviolent political action and 
guerilla warfare were often the same.  Tracing the party’s history to the present day, one sees 
clear patterns and moments of change, as well as ample evidence of political activity.   
Chapter Two explores the ways in which the PKK’s ideology has not remained static, but 
rather has evolved throughout the party’s existence.  This chapter examines five areas of 
ideology and the ways in which changes affected or were the result of strategic decisions.  This is 
important, as the primary functions of ideology are to legitimize and guide action as well as 
justifying the use of violence both within the group and to external audiences.  Consequently, 
ideology is an important component in setting priorities and determining appropriate action.  The 
PKK’s strategic adjustments to its ideology demonstrate its awareness of various constituencies, 
its foremost devotion to the Kurdish ethno-nationalist cause, and, most importantly, its ability to 
learn over time and adapt their ideology in order to attract supporters and maintain its legitimacy. 
Chapter Three examines the tactics the PKK employs to pursue its goals through more 
conventional political action.  Its status in many countries as a terrorist organization complicates 
these efforts, as does the Turkish government’s frequent attempts to shut down any expression of 
Kurdish identity in the Turkish political arena; however, both in Europe and in Turkey, the PKK 
has continued to remain active in politics either directly or through its interactions with other 
groups.  These forms of political activity fall into the two categories of institutional and 
confrontational participation.   
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 Within Turkey, the PKK has mostly lacked direct access to institutional politics.  
Interactions between the PKK and legal Kurdish parties are complicated, and unclear.  While the 
parties claim independence, many Turks accuse them of being PKK fronts.  In addition, even if 
the party is organizationally independent of the PKK, the PKK’s popularity among many 
Kurdish voters means that the PKK remains influential.  Ocalan’s endorsement of an early 
Kurdish party, for example, increased its popularity significantly.  Ocalan’s arrest provided a 
unique opportunity for the PKK to have an interlocutor inside the institution in order to act 
directly in the political arena.  The PKK is also active outside the system, supporting public 
protest and the distribution of media produced in Turkey and in Europe.  This allows it to spread 
information and awareness, breaking the government’s monopoly on information and 
demonstrating its level of support.  Again, the relationships between the PKK and various 
individuals and organizations organizing this activity are opaque and uncertain.   While the 
extent and exact nature of the party’s involvement in Turkey’s institutional and confrontational 
political systems is unclear, the fact of its involvement is unmistakable. 
 In Europe, open and democratic systems make it easier for the PKK to have more formal 
institutional participation.  This occurs primarily under organizations with alternate names, and 
consists of forging alliances with NGOs, lobbying parliament and building awareness and 
agreement among citizens.  Here, too, the PKK is active outside the system, as it is the site of 
most of the PKK’s media production and the location of many public protests over the period.  
The inefficacy of violence in Europe, as seen in Chapter Four, makes this all the more pressing, 
as political activity is the means by which the PKK must get out its message. 
Finally, Chapter Four looks at the political violence that has earned the PKK its 
reputation for brutality.  Violence is the most controversial means by which the PKK attains 
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political goals, even when it is the only way the PKK believes it can achieve its goals.  Evidence 
shows that the violence overall is not the desired end, but rather a means by which the PKK 
seeks to achieve political goals.  A careful analysis of terrorist attacks demonstrates tactical 
adjustments in order to maintain the party’s legitimacy.  When necessary, these tactics seek to 
limit the use of violence.  Tactics also include shifting target types so that attacks are not directed 
at civilians but rather at the military, or avoiding people altogether.   
Dividing PKK terrorist attacks by region, one can examine trends that demonstrate the 
ways in which the PKK has changed and constrained its use of violence in order to ensure that 
the violence does not overshadow political goals.  Such patterns are inconsistent with the popular 
perception that the PKK acts only for revenge or glory; while these motives may be present on 
an individual level, broader trends demonstrate that for the PKK, violence is a tool, not a goal. 
 In the Southeast of Turkey, there is not only a decrease in terrorism over time, but a clear 
decline in attacks on civilians.  While the PKK initially constructed a narrative in which they 
only attacked collaborators and those working with the state, ultimately they reduced violence 
against civilians across the board.   
In Western Turkey, the decrease in attacks is even more marked.  Overall, violence here 
is employed in a much more careful manner, with a higher focus on symbolic targets and lower 
casualty rates.  In addition, there is a clear effort to limit the number of casualties incurred in a 
given attack.  This becomes particularly apparent when comparing PKK attacks with those 
perpetrated by other terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda.   
 Finally, in Europe, the PKK initially limited violence.  This is clear from the highly 
coordinated attacks across multiple cities and countries, carefully planned and executed, which 
cause no casualties.   However, after even these attacks sparked censure from European 
 	   137 
governments and threatened to hamper the PKK’s more conventional political activity, the party 
ceased its use of violence altogether.  Europe provides one of the strongest examples of an 
instance in which the PKK clearly adjusted its tactics to adapt to a negative response in order to 
protect their public image.   
 All of these areas provide examples of ways in which the PKK has adjusted its tactics and 
strategy in order to remain relevant in discussions surrounding the Kurdish issue; retain its 
reputation as a legitimate political actor; and ensure continued public support.  The party adapts 
to changing circumstances in a variety of areas, demonstrating its rationality, its ability to learn, 
and its desire to be seen as a legitimate political actor. 
 
Policy Implications 
Since March 2013, the PKK has maintained a ceasefire with the Turkish government.  
Discussions between the PKK, BDP and the government are ongoing.  Proposals have come to 
the table that would have been unthinkable a decade ago; this is undoubtedly in part due to Prime 
Minister Erdogan’s ability to take unpopular stances without a serious threat to his popularity, as 
he lacks a strong political challenger.  In addition, as liberals have fled the AKP coalition, the 
Kurdish party has made an excellent ally.  Issues on the table include the 10 percent national 
threshold for elections and the restoration of Kurdish names to towns and provinces in the 
Southeast.  The government has also taken positive steps in their decision to allow Kurdish 
languages to be spoken on radio and television, in addition to beginning to offer optional classes 
in Kurdish languages.  Finally, BDP deputies have been permitted to meet with Ocalan on Imrali 
for the first time since his arrest; several meetings have now taken place, beginning on January 
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2013.535  Neither these steps nor negotiations with Ocalan have provoked the strong public 
outcry that many expected; in fact, the cries for negotiation have been significantly louder.536 
In return, Karayilan has promised to withdraw PKK troops back into Northern Iraq and to 
continue to respect the ceasefire.  After the spike in violence in 2012, this is a significant 
improvement.  While disarmament is a high priority, given its history it is difficult for the PKK 
to trust the Turkish state. This is particularly true given the Turkish military’s frequent disregard 
for ceasefires.  However, Karayilan has publicly expressed a willingness to disarm and Ocalan 
has publicly acknowledged engaging with the government in disarmament talks. 537  Though 
difficult, solving the issues surrounding disarmament are not impossible; peace negotiations with 
other extra-governmental organizations have encountered similar challenges. 
It is possible that Ocalan’s willingness to engage with the Turkish government is entirely 
due to his own desire to emerge triumphant from Imrali; the comparison with Nelson Mandela is 
not uncommon among outside observers or from Ocalan himself.  Whether the motivation for a 
negotiated peace rests on Ocalan’s ego or a genuine desire for reconciliation is irrelevant: the 
PKK, as well as thousands of Kurdish citizens, have demonstrated that they will follow him.  
Perhaps the most dramatic example was a hunger strike in the fall of 2013.  Hundreds of 
prisoners in Turkey’s prisons stated that their resolve to fast until the government removed 
restrictions on Kurdish language in the public sphere and improved Ocalan’s living conditions.538  
After sixty-eight days, Ocalan ended the hunger strike with an announcement through his 
brother.  The Turkish government’s easy access to an interlocutor with this kind of power and 
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influence makes the logistics of negotiations relatively straightforward and could help to 
facilitate discussion. 
The PKK has clearly demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with the Turkish 
government and has released a comprehensive document detailing its aims.  AKP’s response, 
while an improvement over its predecessors, has still proven disappointing.  Given that three 
decades of pursing a military solution, often with brutal and inhumane tactics, have consistently 
failed, perhaps it is time for AKP to take the PKK up on its offer, not temporarily, but in pursuit 
of a lasting peace. 
In addition to its importance regarding Turkish domestic politics, and even regional 
dynamics, the PKK is representative of multiple groups around the world who have turned to 
violence, not out of an inherent desire to destroy, but because they felt it was the option 
promising the best chance of success.  Many of these groups have demonstrated their willingness 
to come to the table and participate in negotiations and conventional politics, like the PKK has 
done in Turkey.  Understanding these groups as rational, political actors is essential in ending 
such conflicts, particularly as the futility of military solutions is proven time and time again. 
Whether or not the global community wants to accept it, the PKK and many other extra-
national groups have expressed a desire to be at the table, with the stated intention of seeking 
involvement in legal, democratic politics.  It would be foolish to take this entirely at face value; 
the PKK has proven that it is foolish to dismiss its capabilities either as a political actor or as a 
security threat.  However, it is also important to acknowledge that the PKK has been sending 
consistent signs throughout much of its existence that it is willing to turn to negotiation and 
compromise, rather than violence.  The PKK is undoubtedly not the only group for whom this is 
the case; groups such as the IRA, FARC, ETA, ANC have demonstrated that they, too, might be 
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interested in participating in nonviolent political systems.  The individual case of the PKK 
demonstrates the importance of dealing with such groups as political actors, rather than 
bloodthirsty outlaws.  This will not be the case for all groups; one of the lingering questions is 
how to ascertain groups’ willingness to negotiate and participate in political systems, especially 
when things do not go their way.  However, it is only through the close examination of 
individual cases like that of the PKK that the international community might begin to discover 
the answer. 
Perhaps the most provocative question in existing literature on the PKK is that of how it 
has maintained its popularity despite the huge amounts of violence it has either directly inflicted 
or unleashed upon Turkey’s citizens.  This paper demonstrates that part of the answer is that it is 
not by accident; rather it is the result of deliberate planning, careful adaptation, and learning 
from past mistakes.  The PKK leadership cannot be simplified to a bloodthirsty group out for 
revenge.  Instead, the reality is much more complex, and must include an understanding of the 
PKK’s identity as a savvy and competent political actor, making decisions regarding strategy and 
tactics that will ensure the enduring legitimacy and relevance of the party.   
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APPENDIX I: FIGURES 
 
Year Europe West Turkey Southeast Turkey Total 
1984 0 0 8 8 
1985 0 0 0 0 
1986 0 0 6 6 
1987 2 1 31 34 
1988 1 1 24 26 
1989 0 1 85 86 
1990 0 0 139 139 
1991 25 15 86 126 
1992 49 39 297 385 
1993 15 0 17 32 
1994 18 23 151 192 
1995 98 1 30 129 
1996 4 0 30 34 
1997 0 1 16 17 
1998 0 4 19 23 
1999 13 13 39 65 
2000 0 0 6 6 
2001 0 0 4 4 
2002 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 4 4 
2004 0 5 13 18 
2005 0 7 32 39 
2006 1 14 35 50 
2007 0 3 26 29 
2008 4 3 21 28 
2009 0 2 5 7 
2010 0 3 16 19 
2011 1 4 31 36 
2012 0 4 145 149 
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Year Civilian Government Military 
1984 2 1 5 
1986 1 2 3 
1987 22 5 3 
1988 14 1 9 
1989 41 5 33 
1990 37 13 75 
1991 40 26 54 
1992 159 46 156 
1993* 21 7 1 
1994 66 22 93 
1995 93 9 7 
1996 14 4 15 
1997 11 2 4 
1998 8 4 11 
1999 19 21 22 
2000 0 0 7 
2001 1 0 4 
2003 1 2 0 
2004 4 2 10 
2005 14 7 14 
2006 12 8 25 
2007 7 2 20 
2008 12 5 6 
2009 3 0 3 
2010 2 3 7 
2011 16 5 8 
2012 13 28 89 
Total 547 230 684 
Figure 5: Number of Attacks by Year and Target Type (Table). Due to the absence of the year in 
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   Total Attacks Attacks Pre-1999 (%) Attacks Post-1999 (%) 
Civilian 552 37.00 20.00 
Southeast Turkey 312 27.00 14.00 
West Turkey 103 76.00 62.00 
Europe 131 71.00 5.00 
        
Military 691 38.00 46.00 
Southeast Turkey 664 48.00 55.00 
West Turkey 18 13.00 12.00 
Europe 1 0.00 0.00 
        
All Targets 1729 100.00 100.00 
Southeast Turkey 1325 75.00 81.00 
West Turkey 148 7.00 13.00 
Europe 232 17.00 4.00 
Figure 6: Change over time regarding percentage of attacks on a specific target in a particular location. 
 
Casualties Frequency Cumulative (%) 
0 559 32.96 
1 - 2 382 55.48 
3 - 5 315 74.06 
6 - 10 224 87.26 
11 - 50 204 99.29 
51 - 85 10 99.88 
86 - 167 2 100 
Numbers for all perpetrators, all regions 

















  Mean Casualties Number of Attacks 
Civilian* 4.85 552 
Southeast Turkey 6.24 396 
West Turkey*** 2.28, 5.53 73, 103 
Europe 0.15 131 
      
Military 6.38 691 
Southeast Turkey 6.41 664 
West Turkey*** 6.0, 6.38 10, 18 
Europe 0 1 
      
All Targets 4.79 1729 
Southeast Turkey 6.17 1325 
West Turkey*** 2.28, 6.17  83, 148 
Europe 0.15 232 
* These numbers include civilians deemed “collaborators”. 
*** The first number is the average number of casualties for 
confirmed PKK attacks.  The second is the average casualties 
for all possible PKK attacks, including TAK attacks. 
Figure 8: Civilian and military attacks and casualties by location 
 
   Europe West Turkey Southeast Turkey Other Total 
Civilian 131 103 312 6 552 
Collaborator 0 1 85 1 87 
Government 76 20 132 3 232 
Military 1 18 664 4 691 
Infrastructure 0 1 105 1 108 
Media 13 0 7 0 20 
Symbolic 222 148 98 4 446 
Other 11 1 20 3 35 
** Some locations unknown; therefore, totals may not add up 
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This analysis excluded 1993, as it is not 
included in the GTD. Averages include all 
perpetrators, all regions. 
Figure 10: Average Number of Attacks Per Year 
 
 
  Southeast Turkey West Turkey Europe 
PKK: Confirmed 125 31 6 
PKK: Possible 125 167 6 
TAK n/a 32 n/a 
Maximum casualties inflicted in a single attack. PKK: Possible 
includes TAK attacks. 





  Europe West Turkey Southeast Turkey Symbolic Targets 
PKK: confirmed 0.18 2.28 5.39 1.1 
PKK: possible* 0.15 5.53 5.38 10.56 
TAK n/a 9.81 n/a 6.1 
* This includes TAK casualties, as TAK may or may not be under the control of the PKK 
Figure 12: Mean Casualties by Perpetrator and Location
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Figure 13: Map of the Grand Bazaar.  The Arrow indicates the approximate location of the 
bomb (reports only provided the street name).539 
 
   Civilian Civilian Collaborator  Government Military 
PKK: confirmed 458 72 148 598 
PKK: possible 80 15 72 87 
TAK 9 0 7 4 
PKK: Possible includes only those attacks which may or may not have been PKK, and 
includes no TAK attacks 
Figure 14: Number of Attacks by Target Type and Perpetrator 
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APPENDIX II: KEY FIGURES 
 
Note: Below, I am following the most standard practice for acronyms. Some organizations are 
most commonly referred to with their English-language acronym, while others use Turkish, 
Kurmanji, Arabic, etc.  In this appendix, I am endeavoring to use correct spelling where 
appropriate; throughout the reminder of the document, these names have been Anglicized. 
 
Groups and Political Parties 
 
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party (sometimes called JDP) 
Established in 2001, AKP currently holds the majority of seats in the Turkish legislature, 
having received significant proportions of the national vote in all elections since its 
founding. 
BDP Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi/Peace and Democracy Party.   
Founded in 2008, the BDP is the current iteration of a mainstream single-issue, pro-
Kurdish party. 
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partesi/Republican People’s Party   
CHP is the party of secular Kemalism in Turkey, and is currently the main opposition 
party for AKP.  Historically, it has had close relations with the army and has been 
inflexible regarding the PKK.  It often refers to itself as the party of Atatürk. 
Hizbullah/Hizbullahı/Hizbullahî Kurdî/Turkish Hizbullah  
Unrelated to Lebanese Hizbullah, this Islamist and Kurdish nationalist group was 
primarily active in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  There have long been rumors that in 
the early 1990s, the Turkish government financied the group in order to combat the PKK. 
Köy Korucular Village Guards 
Begun in the 1980s, these civilian militias were armed and paid by the Turkish 
government as a way to combat the PKK.  They often play on tribal politics and have 
proven extremely divisive. 
MİT Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı/National Intelligence Organization  
 Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Partiye Karkêren Kurdistan  
Founded in 1979, the PKK has become the dominant representative of Turkey’s Kurdish 
population.  Since 1984, the party has used violence to fight for its ethno-nationalist aims; 
consequently, it is still classified as a terrorist organization by the EU and the US.  The 
PKK is also referred to as referred to as the People’s Defense Force/Hêzên Parastina Gel 
(HPG); Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK); the People’s 
Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel). The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan/Eniya 
Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan (ERNK) was the party’s longtime political arm in Europe. 
SHP Sosyaldemokratik Halkçı Parti/Social Democrat Populist Party  
This Leftist party included many of the initial outspoken Kurdish MPs, before leaving 
due to its unwillingness to adequately address the Kurdish issue. 
TAK Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan/Kurdistan Freedom Hawks 
 This off-shoot of the PKK has been active since the early 2000s, committing acts of 
political violence in Western Turkey.  The extent of its current relations with the PKK is 
unknown. 
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Timeline of Kurdish Political Parties in Turkey 
All of these parties with the exception of DEHAP and DTH were shut down by the Turkish courts 
for various reasons. 
 
HEP Halkın Emek Partisi/People’s Labor Party: 1990-1993  
DEP Demokrasi Partisi/Democracy Party: 1993-1994 
HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi/People’s Democracy Party: 1994-2003 
DTH Demokratık Toplum Halkın/Democratic Society Movement: 2000-2005.  
DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi/Democratic People’s Party: 1997-2005 
DTP Demokratık Toplum Partısı/Democratic Society Party: 2005-2009 
 This party was formed with a merger by its predecessors, DTH and DEHAP. 





Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
An officer in the Ottoman army during WWI, Atatürk resigned soon after the end of the 
war to lead resistance to European occupiers.  The founder of modern Turkey, basically 
created Turkish nationalism and the fiercely secularist ideology of Kemalism.  Ataturk 
was the first president of Turkey, a position he held until his death in 1938. 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
Erdoğan has held the office of Prime Minister since 2003.  He was one of the co-founders 
of AKP along with Abdullah Gül, and remains the party head.  Known for his social 
conservatism and often-authoritarian leadership style, Erdoğan remains extremely 
popular in Turkey.  He has done more than any of his predecessors to resolve Turkey’s 
conflict with the PKK. 
Murat Karalıyan  
PKK’s current field commander and de facto leader, Karayılan has been a member of 
PKK since its founding in 1979. 
Abdullah Ocalan  
Known as Apo, or ‘uncle’, to his followers, Öcalan is the founder and leader of the PKK.  
He has been the sole prisoner on Imralı Island since his arrest in 1999. 
Turgut Özal  
Özal served as Turkey’s Prime Minister (1983-1989) and President (1989-1993).  One of 
the first mainstream Turkish politicians to be open about his Kurdish heritage, he was 
also the first President to agree to negotiations with PKK. He died suddenly of a heart 
attack during his presidency. 
 
 
Kurdish Parties Outside of Turkey 
 
KCK Group of Communities in Kurdistan/ Koma Civakên Kurdistan 
 	   149 
Founded by PKK, KCK is an umbrella organization technically encompassing Kurdish 
groups in surrounding countries.  KCK retains Öcalan as its honorary leader, and its de 
facto leadership has historically included many prominent PKK members.  
KDP Partiya Demokrat Kurdistan/Kurdistan Democratic Party 
This Iraqi Kurdish party is led by Massoud Barzani, the current president of Iraqi 
Kurdistan/Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). 
KPE Kurdish Parliament in Exile 
 Located in Europe, this group contains many prominent Kurdish intellectuals and 
politicians.  It is nominally independent of the PKK. 
PJAK Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê/Party of Free Life of Kurdistan  
 PJAK is the primary Kurdish organization pursuing political violence in Iran.	  
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
The rival party to KDP within Iraqi Kurdistan, PUK is run by Jalal Talabani. 
PYD Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat/Democratic Union Party 
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